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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that Ashura rituals do not represent the embodiment of a 
culture of death; they represent a spiritual awakening, strengthening faith by condensing 
and intensifying religious events, unifying and empowering the Shia identity. Secondly, it 
argues that Ashura rituals are not merely rituals of lamentation or a source of salvation 
and redemption, but represent an inspiring force with dynamic principles used as a 
popular platform to effect changes in the socio-political sphere. 
This research probes into the historical evolution in form and content of Ashura 
rituals. It reveals three major stages Ashura rituals that have passed through. 
This research uses a model derived from Emile Durkheim’s social ritual theory to 
explain how rituals transform knowledge into belief and membership into belonging. It 
reveals how Ashura rituals are constructed, embraced, and evolved as well as how they 
are shaping Shia identity and communal sense. The discussion also centers around 
important Shia leaders who were instrumental in shifting the meanings of Ashura from 
the soteriological to the revolutionary meanings as well as leaders who have 
operationalized such meanings. It compares current ritual practice in Iran and Lebanon. 
Lastly, the research concludes by discussing the political implication of such shift. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The martyrdom of Hussein and his companions at the Battle of Karbala and the 
Ashura rituals that ensued are at the heart of shaping Shia identity and communal sense. 
The Battle moral allegory has developed into a cultural fixation centered around Ashura 
rituals coloring all parts of Shia life, religious, social, and political. Some view these 
rituals from the spiritual, pietistic, and socio-political angles, for establishing powerful 
and long lasting moods and motivation among Shia, reinforcing their Shia communal 
sense. Others view them as primarily a culture of death and merely as rituals of 
lamentation for a source of salvation and redemption that is limited to ten days of breast-
beating, self-flagellations, visitations to the Hussein tomb, public mourning processions, 
lamentation poetry, and theatrical representations of the battle of Karbala.1 Are the 
Ashura rituals an embodiment of a culture of death? According to ritual theory, the 
Ashura rituals, like many other rituals, give people a consciousness of their membership 
in the group and convey the experience of social integration. For the Shia, such rituals 
represent social solidarity and are the glue that holds Shia society together. 
This research will argue two major points concerning Ashura rituals. First, Ashura 
rituals do not represent the embodiment of a culture of death; instead, they represent a 
spiritual awakening, strengthening the faith of the people by condensing and intensifying 
religious events, which play a unifying and empowering role in the community by 
cementing Shia identity. Secondly, Ashura rituals are not just mere rituals of lamentation 
and a source of salvation and redemption, but they represent an inspiring force and 
dynamic principles for the constituents that can be used as a popular platform to reach the 
common Muslim masses to effect changes in the socio-political sphere.  
                                                 
1 Janet Afary, “Shi'i Narratives of Karbala and Christian Rites of Penance: Michel Foucault and the 
Culture of the Iranian Revolution, 1978-1979,” Radical History Review 86, (2003): 7-35, 27; Lara Deeb, 
“Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, 25, no. 1 (2005): 135. 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of this thesis is two-fold: First, it tries to assess common ideas 
surrounding Shia rituals, more specifically the culture of death misconception that is 
pervasive in many circles, media and scholarship. This is accomplished by emphasizing 
the spiritual and social dimensions of Shia rituals, as well as their impact on Shia unity 
and identity. The episode of Karbala became the stage on which the spirit of an Imam2 of 
the Ahl al-Bayt3 (family of the Prophet Muhammad) was put for display, not as a ritual of 
death observances, but as the symbol of human tragedy and the scene of love and loyalty, 
bravery and sacrifice, and belief and belonging.  
Second, this research assesses other common ideas surrounding Shia rituals, and 
more specifically suggests that Ashura rituals are not just mere rituals of lamentation and 
a source of salvation and redemption. This is accomplished by emphasizing the inspiring 
force and dynamic principles rooted within Ashura rituals and how they are used as a 
popular platform to effect changes in the socio-political sphere. The arguments trace the 
historical evolution in content and form of Ashura rituals, discuss how the metaphors of 
Ashura, with their vibrant display, have been used historically by many Shia leaders, and 
show how these rituals and their meaning have changed over time noting the political and 
social contexts. The discussion stresses the later Ashura rituals fundamental 
reformulation that endorses the use of rituals as a convenient weapon against repressive 
regimes to awaken Muslim masses and revive in them the spirit of martyrdom inspired by 
the episode of Karbala.  
In the conclusion is a discussion about the relevance of the findings for U.S. 
foreign policymakers vis-à-vis of Shia, taking account of the spiritual, social, and 
political importance of Ashura rituals to Shia populace.    
                                                 
2 Imam: The leader of an often small Islamic Community (“a village Imam”). Sometimes the title also 
is used to suggest an individual who stands at the pinnacle of the entire Shia Islamic community. In recent 
decades, the title has been applied by followers to Musa Sadr of Lebanon and Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran. 
3 Ahl al-Bayt is a phrase meaning People of the House, or family. In the Islamic tradition it refers to 
the household of Muhammad. 
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C. LITTERATURE REVIEW 
The roots of the Sunni-Shia schism are found in the crisis of succession that 
occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD. The Sunnis believe in the 
caliphate while the Shia believe in the imamate. Shia have traditionally believed that 
there was a chain of pious descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, beginning with his 
son-in-law Ali (d. 661 AD), who were meant to succeed him, one after the other, 
following his death4. The Shia consider these imams to be infallible religious guides for 
humanity, although not Prophets, and also believe that devotion to the imams brings them 
closer to God.5 
The Sunnis, on the other hand, have traditionally held that the caliphs were the 
legitimate successors to the Prophet Muhammad. The caliphs were selected according to 
a political process, rather than being explicitly selected by the Prophet himself. The Shia 
consider the caliphs to be usurpers of the authority of the imams.6 This fundamental 
disagreement was compounded by later political divisions, which encouraged further 
divergence in political and legal systems, ritual practices, and theological doctrines.  
The Battle of Karbala is the most important symbolic event for Shia. The battle 
serves as a religious model for behavior among Shia who are expected to struggle on the 
path to God, even if they face oppression and persecution from the Sunni rulers. The vast 
majority of distinctly Shia rituals are derived from the events that took place in the Battle 
of Karbala. 
According to the surviving sources, Muslims living in southern Iraq pleaded with 
the Prophet’s grandson Hussein, who lived in Western Arabia, to come and save them  
 
 
                                                 
4 Kamran S. Aghaie, “The Origins of the Sunnite-Shi’ite Divide and the Emergence of the Ta’ziyeh 
Tradition” The Drama Review 49, 4 (Winter 2005). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Martin S. Kramer, Shi‘ism, Resistance, and Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 49.  
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from the tyrannical rule of the caliph Yazid.7 Through their letters, they offered their 
support to him and asked him to claim his rightful position as the leader of the Muslim 
community.    
In an empty desert named Karbala, located near the Euphrates River in Southern 
Iraq, Hussein and his followers, numbering, according to tradition, 72 men along with 
women and children, were surrounded by thousands of Yazid’s troops. During the 
standoff that ensued Yazid’s troops taunted and insulted Hussein and his followers, and 
refused them water and food, until Hussein openly pledged his allegiance to the caliph. 
Over the course of the first 10 days of the month of Muharram, Hussein pleaded for food 
and water for the children, but was absolutely firm in his rejection of Yazid. On the 10th 
day of the month of Muharram, Hussein’s male supporters were killed one by one in 
combat, with Hussein being the last to be martyred. This 10th day of the month of 
Muharram is known as Ashura.8 
After this battle and in the late Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, Shia 
sentiments evolved into a wide variety of Shia strains, from which Twelver Shia 
emerged. It was also during this time that the foundation was laid for the rich tradition of 
Shia rituals. 
Since the Battle of Karbala, five major rituals developed including the memorial 
services (majalis al-ta’ziya), the visitation of Hussein’s tomb in Karbala particularly on 
the occasion of the 10th day of the month of Muharram (Ashura) and the 40th day after the 
battle (ziyarat Ashura and ziyarat arba‘in), the public mourning processions (al-mawakib 
al-husayniyya), the representation of the battle of Karbala in the form of a play 
(tashabih), and the self-flagellation (zangeel and tatbir). Within these major rituals are 
other rituals, chest beating (latm), recitation of Karbala narratives (qira’ah) by a reciter 
(qari or khateeb), and niyahah (recitation of rhythmic lamentation poetry).9 
                                                 
7 Mahmoud Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islām: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Āshūrā in 
Twelver Shī’ism (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 99. 
8 Ibid., 117. 
9 Yitzhak Nakash, “An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of Ashura,” Die Welt des Islams 33 
(November 1993). 
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All, or some, of these rituals are performed among different Shia communities 
worldwide during the Karbala commemorations. In fact, there are some Shia 
communities that have elaborated on these rituals and developed new ones altogether. 
Some examples of regional rituals not universal to all Shia are the use of the zangeel 
(swinging chains linked together at one end, used in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, India and 
Pakistan), chest beating while holding razor blades between the fingers (practiced among 
the Shia of South Asia), and tatbir (striking the skull with a sword, found in Iraq and 
Lebanon).10  
These rituals play an important role in reinforcing Shia distinct identity and 
collective memory. They allow the mourner not only to weep over the suffering of 
Hussein, his companions, and his family but also to join the past with the present by 
linking Hussein’s experience to that of the believer in his lifetime. Through theses rituals, 
the believer can also protest emotionally against contemporary injustice and oppression 
as he experiences it around himself.11 
The development of the Ashura rituals and their evolution throughout history 
were influenced by the socio-political changes in the society. The memorial services and 
the visitation of Hussein’s tomb were the oldest vehicles for invoking the memory of 
Karbala and reinforcing Shia collective memory. Whereas these two rituals were 
established in the formative period of Shia, when the Shia constituted a minority ruled by 
Sunni dynasties, the appearance of the public processions and the tashabih reflected the 
policies of Buyid and Safavid rulers who sought to elaborate the Ashura observances and 




                                                 
10 Peter J. Chelkowski, “From the Sun-Scorched Desert of Iran to the Beaches of Trinidad: Ta'Ziyeh's 
Journey from Asia to the Caribbean.” TDR 49, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 156; Augustus R. Norton, “Ritual, 
Blood, and Shiite Identity: Ashura in Nabatiyya, Lebanon,” The Drama Review 49, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 
140. 
11 Muhammad Mahdi. Shams al-Din, The Rising of Al-Husayn: its Impact on the Consciousness of 
Muslim Society (Bury St. Edmunds, Great Britain: St. Edmundsbury Press, 1985), 213. 
12 Aghaie, “The Origins of the Sunnite-Shi’ite Divide and the Emergence of the Ta’ziyeh Tradition.” 
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introduction of the ritual of self-flagellation by Turkoman tribes and Christian Armenians 
reflected the input of Shia converts, demonstrating the influence of Christian practices on 
Shia.13 
Furthermore, Ashura rituals make Shia Islam a convenient state builder. This was 
true with the Iranian Revolution in 1979, with Iraqi self-determination in 2004-05, and in 
many ways with Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel and the group’s potential future 
control of the Lebanese government given that Lebanese Shia represent a plurality of 
Lebanese population. 
In Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini14 understood profoundly the spirit of the 
Ashura movement and was angry that the so-called ulama and khateeb (reciters) had 
transformed its true spirit into a mere ritual of lamentation over the martyrdom of 
Hussein and his companions. He criticized and condemned these persons and rejuvenated 
the true spirit of Ashura among the Muslim masses, who were sincerely devoted to 
Muharram ceremonies.15 He used Ashura rituals as effective weapons to propagate his 
revolutionary message based on the Islamic values of justice and truth. His ultimate 
secret of success was Ashura rituals. Had there been no such platform to reach the 
masses, he might have failed to achieve his goal of creating an Islamic state.  
In Iraq, the ability of the Iraqi Shia political parties in 2004 and 2005 to mobilize 
the faithful in multiple electoral events is also emblematic of the Ashura rituals. The 
world says Iraq’s Shia rally together under the guidance of their clerics despite individual 
political differences.16 Much of the Iraqi experience, like the Iranian experience, was a 
result of public confidence in the authority of Shia clerics and lack of confidence in 
secular governance. Under Sistani’s auspices and after, 1,400 years of Sunni hegemony 
in the region and literal subjugation of the Shia under Sunni rule, Hussein’ spiritual heirs 
had established the first Shia led Arab nation in history by popular election. 
                                                 
13 Chelkowski, “From the Sun-Scorched Desert of Iran to the Beaches of Trinidad: Ta'Ziyeh's Journey 
from Asia to the Caribbean;” Norton, “Ritual, Blood, and Shiite Identity: Ashura in Nabatiyya, Lebanon.”  
14 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: The father of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
15 Ruhollah Khomeini, trans., and annotated by Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and 
Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Iran: Mizan Press, 1981). 
16 Ahmed H. Al-Rahim, “The Sistani Factor,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (July 2005): 50. 
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In Lebanon, the Lebanese group Hezbollah (Party of God), under the leadership 
of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, has been using the Ashura ceremonies as an effective 
weapon to propagate its message. In chants at Ashura processions, mourners equate 
Hezbollah's modern-day enemies Israel and the United States with the dreadful Yazid. In 
Ashura rituals, Hezbollah lament not only Hussein martyrdom but its own guerrillas who 
died fighting in wars against Israel. 
The United State found itself engaged politically, economically, and militarily, in 
a war within the Muslim world. A war that is ill defined, ill executed, and against an 
enemy that is ill recognized. The U.S. cannot afford to start a conflict with any Shia 
group or Shia state without understanding the essence of Shia identity and unity, a unity 
strongly tied to Shia remembrance of the Battle of Karbala and all its spiritual and socio-
political dimensions. 
D. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis begins with a brief description of the schism between Shia and Sunni, 
highlighting the political and legal systems, ritual practices, and theological doctrines. 
More importantly, this background chapter depicts the battle of Karbala from the 
historical and spiritual perspectives as seen by Shia historians and Shia piety. 
In Chapter III, five major Ashura rituals are described including the memorial 
services (majalis al-ta’ziya), the visitation of Hussein’s tomb in Karbala particularly on 
the occasion of the 10th day of the month of Muharram (Ashura) and the 40th day after the 
battle (ziyarat Ashura and ziyarat arba‘in), the public mourning processions (al-mawakib 
al-husayniyya), the representation of the battle of Karbala in the form of a play 
(tashabih), and the self-flagellation (zangeel and tatbir). A description of other rituals 
ingrained with these major rituals will also be presented, such as chest beating (latm), 
recitation of Karbala narratives (qira’ah) by a reciter (qari or khateeb), and niyahah 
(recitation of rhythmic lamentation poetry).17 This depiction of Ashura rituals will be 
presented in the form currently practiced.  
                                                 
17 Nakash, “An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of Ashura.”  
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In Chapter IV, a thorough depiction of the historical evolution in form and content 
of Ashura rituals are presented. It reveals three major stages Ashura rituals have passed 
through. The first stage began shortly after the Battle of Karbala (year 680 AD), and it 
continued until the fall of Baghdad at the hands of Hulagu. The second stage began at the 
time of the fall of Baghdad and continued through the Muslim dark ages until the modern 
period. The third and final stage was from the beginning of the modern period until the 
present.18 Within these major stages, relevant dynasties that impacted the Ashura rituals 
are discussed: Umayyad, Abbasid, Buyids, Fatmids, Safavid, and Qajar, among others.     
In Chapter V, Emile Durkheim’s (1858-1917) social ritual theory is used to show 
the importance of Ashura rituals in group cohesion and solidarity by explaining how 
Ashura rituals are constructed, embraced, and evolved as well as how they are used by 
Shia as a way to reunite and to reconfirm common values shared between members of 
Shia societies. This analysis relies on Randall Collins model, which is derived from 
Durkheim's seminal theory of ritual presented in his book The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life. This model contains handful of elements considered prominent to 
Durkheim's theory in explaining how rituals transform knowledge into belief and 
membership into belonging.  
Chapter VI discusses in detail how the contents of the third stage of the rites of 
remembrance developed, how Shia leaders have used them, and what their political 
implications for U.S. foreign policy are. The discussion revolves around important Shia 
leaders who were instrumental in shifting the meanings of Ashura from the soteriological 
to the revolutionary meanings as well as on the leaders who have operationalized such 
meanings. A discussion of how this new meaning has affected the practice of Ashura 




                                                 
18 Shams al-Din, The Rising of Al Husayn: Its Impact on the Consciousness of Muslim Society, 161. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The martyrdom of Hussein and his companions at Karbala was one of the 
defining turning points in Islamic history in shaping Shia identity and communal sense.19 
The events in Karbala marked a moment of increased fissure in the Muslim community, 
often pointed to by Shia Muslims today as the decisive root of Shia-Sunni separate 
identity.20 This battle on the plain of Karbala was much more than the slaughter of a 
small band of pious loyalists who were faithful to the family of the Prophet by an 
overwhelming military force; it was also an ideological battle between a group of 
religiously devoted individuals and a militarily powerful political establishment, making 
Hussein the ultimate tragic-hero figure. 
The martyrdom of Hussein cannot be properly understood if considered merely as an 
isolated event in the early history of the Muslim community. It must be placed, at least 
for the Shia community, as a powerful religious awakening rather than a mere historical 
event.  
This background chapter will provide a brief description of the schism between 
Shia and Sunni with particular emphasis on the political and legal systems, ritual 
practices, and theological doctrines. More importantly, this chapter will also depict the 
battle of Karbala from the historical and spiritual perspectives as seen by Shia historians 
and Shia piety. 
B. SHIA 
Islam, like most other religions, has always been characterized by a number of 
internal divisions. The major division in Islam is between the Sunni and the Shia.  
                                                 
19 Karbala is a city in Iraq, located about 100 km southwest of Baghdad.  
20 Aghaie, “The Origins of the Sunnite-Shi’ite Divide and the Emergence of the Ta’ziyeh Tradition.”  
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According to the 2008 World Fact book,21 published annually by the Central 
Intelligence Agency of the United States, Islam is the second largest religion in the world 
and among them Shia make up about 10-20% of the Muslim population. The majority of 
these Shia are called Twelver (Ithna Asharis, or Ja‘farais), whose name derives from their 
belief that there were 12 imams, the last of whom has existed in a supernatural state of 
occultation from 874 AD to the present. Due to their predominance, they will be the 
primary concern of this research. Twelver Shia are concentrated mostly in Iran (89%), the 
Republic of Azerbaijan (75%), Iraq (60-65%), and also in Bahrain (70%). Although in 
Bahrain, the state is under Sunnite rule. In Lebanon, the Twelver constitutes more than 
40%, the largest single religious group in that country. There are also large minorities in 
Kuwait (20%), Qatar (20%), Afghanistan (19%), Pakistan (20% of the total population, 
especially around Lahore), Tajikistan (5%), and India. Twelver Shia are also found in 
large numbers in Kashmir and the eastern oil producing Persian Gulf regions of Saudi 
Arabia, where they are the majority (11% of the Kingdom’s total population).22 
The term “Shia” conveys the meaning of followers, party, group, associates, 
partisans, or in a rather loose sense, “supporters.” In this rather neutral sense, the word 
“Shia” occurs a number of times in the Quran. A few verses are cited below.23 
As for those who divide their religion and break up into sects (shiya’an), 
you have no part in them in the least: their affair is with Allah: He will in 
the end tell them the truth of all that they did (Al-An’am 6:159) 
Turn you back in repentance to Him, and fear Him: establish regular 
prayers, and be not you among those who join gods with Allah. Those 
who split up their religion, and become (mere) sects (Shiya’an), each party 
(hisbi) rejoicing in that which is with itself (Ar-rum 30:31-32). 
And most surely Abraham was among the Shia of him (i.e., Noah) (Quran 
37:83). 
                                                 
21 CIA World Fact Book website http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/goes/ir.html (accessed January 27, 2009). 
22 Werner Ende, “Shi’ites in Arabia,” Encyclopedia Iranica (June 2004). 
23 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, trans., The Holy Qur’an, Text and Translation (Kuala Lumpur, 2005); Ahlul 
Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project website: http://www.alislam.org/encyclopedia/chapter1b/12.html 
(accessed March 1, 2009). 
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And he (Moses) went into the city at a time when people (of the city) were 
not watching, so he found therein two men fighting, one being of his Shia 
and the other being his enemy, and the one who was of his Shia cried out 
to him for help against the one who was of his enemy (Quran 28:15). 
The term “Shia” was a later usage as a particular designation for the followers of Ali, and 
thereby a distinct denomination within Islam. In the infant years of Islamic history, one 
could hardly speak of a Shia community in the strict sense. There were, at best, partisans 
for one or the other of the leading personalities: the party of Ali, as well as that of 
Uthman, the third “caliph” or “successor,” and the Umayyad rulers after him. At this 
early time of Islam, there was very little that religiously separated the Shia and Sunni. 
Their separation was merely political; however, once the Shia political aspirations were 
more or less denied and the Muslim community transformed into an empire, a distinctly 
Arab empire, the Shia slowly began to withdraw from the larger political implications of 
their movement.  It was at that point, particularly after the martyrdom of Hussein in the 
battle of Karbala in 680 AD, that Shia began to withdraw from society, particularly 
politically. They also began to become a distinct religious sect, and the schism began to 
widen. 
C. SUNNI-SHIA SCHISM 
The roots of the Sunni-Shia schism are found in the crisis of succession that 
occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.  When the Prophet died in 632 AD, 
the community was relatively unprepared to deal with the consequences of who should be 
rightfully named the successor to Muhammad’s leadership of the Islamic faithful. The 
Shia believe the rightful successor was Ali, and the succession should have continued 
through the family line of Muhammad. The Sunnis believe that the Prophet’s successor 
should be chosen through Ijma’24 among the Companions of the Prophet and the 
succession should not be limited to Ahl al-Bayt.25  
                                                 
24 Ijma’ is an Arabic term referring ideally to the consensus of the ummah (the community of 
Muslims, or followers of Islam). Technically, it is “the unanimous doctrine and opinion of the recognized 
religious authorities at any given time.” 
25 Ahl al-Bayt is a phrase meaning People of the House, or family. In the Islamic tradition, it refers to 
the household of Muhammad. 
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During this time of crisis three of the Prophet’s closest companions, Umar, Abu 
Bakr, and Abu Ubaydah, who were from the Prophet’s tribe Quraysh and who had 
migrated with him to Yathrib (Medina) during his migration (hijra) from Mecca in 622 
AD, stated that the successor should be from Quraysh. Umar raised Abu Bakr’s hand in a 
public gathering and declared him Muhammad’s successor.26 Those present who were 
mostly from Medina accepted this and thus the institution of the caliphate came into 
being. Some wanted Ali, but Ali was not as popular as Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr ruled only 
for three years and shortly before he passed away, he appointed Umar as the second 
caliph in 634 AD. Umar ruled for ten years before he was assassinated. He left a process 
of how to choose the next caliph based on a previously appointed committee of notables 
to select the third caliph. They selected Uthman, who was killed in 656 AD by a 
disgruntled mob unhappy with his policies.27 Following Uthman’s death, Ali, 
Muhammad’s son-in-law, assumed the position of caliph. Many of Ali’s supporters 
believed that the Prophet before his death, selected Ali as his successor on more than one 
occasion, For example, they believed that shortly before his death and following his final 
pilgrimage to Mecca, the Prophet gave a speech, at a place called Ghadir Khum, in which 
he raised Ali’s hand and said to the people as follows:28 
Do you not acknowledge that I have a greater claim on each of the 
believers than they have on themselves?” and they replied: “Yes!” And he 
took Ali’s hand and said: “Of whomsoever I am Lord (Mawla), then Ali is 
also his Lord. O God! Be thou the supporter of whoever supports Ali and 
the enemy of whoever opposes him. 
Within the few short years of Ali’s rule, the caliphate was racked by two civil 
wars emanating from two opposition movements. Ali was first challenged by a coalition 
headed by Muhammad’s widow, Aisha (the daughter of Abu Bakr), and later on he was 
challenged by the forces of Muawiyah, the governor of Syria and a relative of Uthman. 
As the head of the state, Ali insisted that prosecuting the killers of Uthman was his 
prerogative. His opponents insisted that he should deliver the killers to them. First, Ali 
                                                 




crushed a triumvirate led by Aisha, the youngest wife of the Prophet. The “Battle of the 
Camel,” so named because it took place around the camel on which Aisha was mounted, 
marked the first time a caliph had led his army against another Muslim army.29 No 
sooner had Ali put down this rebellion, he was faced with another military challenge that 
had more long-range significance from the powerful general Muawiyah, governor of 
Syria. Securely established in Damascus with a strong army, Muawiyah, the nephew of 
Uthman, had refused to step down and accept Ali's appointment of a replacement. In 657 
AD, at Siffin (in modern-day Syria), Ali led his army against his rebellious governor. The 
conflict resulted in a stalemate, and eventually, an arbitrated settlement.30 This 
unsatisfactory outcome yielded two results that would have lasting effects. A splinter 
group of Alids (Shia of Ali), the Kharijites or “seceders,” broke with Ali for having failed 
to subdue Muawiyah; Muawiyah walked away from Siffin and continued to govern Syria, 
extending his rule to Egypt as well. When Kharijites murdered Ali in 661 AD, Muawiyah 
(reigned 661-680 AD) laid claim to the caliphate and ushered in the Umayyad era (661-
750 AD). Muawiyah and his successors were particularly hostile toward Ali’s 
descendants and their supporters. It was in this environment of tension, distrust, and 
conflict along with the crisis resulting from the death of Muawiyah and the accession to 
the throne of his unpopular son, Yazid, that the Battle of Karbala took place in 680 AD. 
Chart 1, describes the early Caliphate succession. 
Prior to the battle of Karbala, there was very little religiously that separated Shia 
and Sunni. The separation was merely political and focused on the question of leadership. 
However, after the Battle of Karbala and throughout centuries, further divergence in 
political and legal systems, ritual practices, and theological doctrines began to crystallize.  
In regards to the political and legal systems, the fundamental difference between 
the two factions is the Sunni belief in the caliphate, as opposed to the Shia belief in the 
Imamate. The caliph was the selected and elected successor of the Prophet. He succeeded 
to political and military leadership but not to Muhammad's religious authority. By 
                                                 
29 Barnaby Rogerson, The Heirs of Muhammad: Islam’s First Century and the Origins of the Sunni-
Shia Split (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2007), 297. 
30 Ibid., 306-309. 
 14
contrast, for the Shia, leadership of the Muslim community is vested in the Imam who 
though not a Prophet, is the divinely inspired, sinless, infallible, religio-political leader of 
the community.31 Shia believe that devotion to the Imams brings them closer to God. The 
Imam must be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad and Ali, the first Imam. He 
is both political leader and religious guide, the final authoritative interpreter of God's will 
as formulated in Islamic law. Sunni Islam on the other hand, came to place final religious 
authority in interpreting Islam in the consensus (ijma’) or collective judgment of the 
community (the consensus of the ulama), the Shia believe in continued divine guidance 
through their divinely inspired guide, the Imam and consider the caliphs to be usurpers of 
the authority of the Imams.32 
In present prevailing Twelver Shia thought, a Shia scholar, who is recognized by 
his peers as sufficiently leaned in the law, bears the title of Mujtahid, one qualified to 
engage in Ijtihad, or the exercise of independent reasoning in applying the law to specific 
issues at hand, whether personal or public. Few Shia are considered educated enough in 
the legal and spiritual tradition to attempt Ijtihad; anyone lacking such expertise is 
required to follow the rulings of a living jurist, a Mujtahid, as his marja al-taqlid or 
“Source or reference of Emulation.”33 In Twelver Shia, Marja is in practice the third 
highest authority on religion and law, right after the Prophet and the Imams. 
On the ritual realm, one of the aspects of devotional practice that continues to 
cause rupture between Sunni and Shia up to the present day is the Shia Ashura ritual. The 
tragic death of Hussein and his relatives and companions in the battle of Karbala on the 
tenth day (Ashura) of the Islamic lunar month of Muharram is, until this day, 
commemorated annually throughout the Shia world. Since the Battle of Karbala, there 
developed five major rituals including the memorial services (majalis al-ta’ziya), the 
visitation of Hussein’s tomb in Karbala particularly on the occasion of the 10th day of the 
month of Muharram (Ashura) and the 40th day after the battle (ziyarat Ashura and ziyarat 
                                                 
31 David Pinault, The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community (New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992), 8-9. 
32 Ibid., 8-9. 
33 Ibid., 7. 
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arba‘in), the public mourning processions (al-mawakib al-husayniyya), the representation 
of the battle of Karbala in the form of a play (tashabih), and the self-flagellation (zangeel 
and tatbir). Ingrained within these major rituals are other rituals such as, chest beating 
(latm), recitation of Karbala narratives (qira’ah) by a reciter (qari or khateeb), and 
niyahah (recitation of rhythmic lamentation poetry).34 The Sunnis take offense to these 
rituals because in some localities they are used to debase the first three caliphs, Abu 
Bakr, Omar, and Uthman whom the Shia consider not the legitimate successors of the 
Prophet. For Sunni, however, all four caliphs including Ali are considered the Rightly-
Guided Caliphs (Al-Khulafa-ur-Rashidun). Furthermore, Wahhabi branch of Sunni 
consider the visitation of Hussein’s tomb and other Imams as shirk or idolatry and view 
those who practice such rituals as heretics. 
Regarding the theological doctrines, Twelver Shia do not differ significantly in 
the tenets and prescriptions that are part of the Sunni “five pillars of Islam,” such as daily 
ritual prayer and fasting. However, they do categorize them by dividing them into Usul 
al-Din, “Roots of Religion” or matters of belief, and Furu al-Din, “Branches of Religion” 
or “legal” matter as shown in Table 1.35 
All these important and key distinctions between Sunni and Shia began to 
crystallize after the battle of Karbala. The battle is considered by Shia theology as the key 
event shaping all subsequent Shia history. Mahmoud Ayoub stated: 36 
The martyrdom of Imam Hussein has been regarded by the Shia 
community as a cosmic event around which the entire history of the world, 
prior as well as subsequent to it, revolves. 
In many ways, it is the most important symbolic event for Shia, after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad because it is the ultimate exemplar of the Sunnite-Shia conflict and 
it is the decisive root of their separate identity.  
                                                 
34 Nakash, “An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of Ashura.” 
35 Christoph Marcinkowski, “Twelver Shi'ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects,” Singapore: 
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006.  
36 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islām: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Āshūrā in Twelver 
Shī’ism, 141. 
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D. BATTLE OF KARBALA 
Although historians have treated Hussein’s martyrdom with varying degrees of 
objectivity, this event has never been regarded by Muslims, especially Shia as a mere 
historical event. The events of Karbala will be depicted from both the historical and 
spiritual angle.  
1. Historical Point of View 
Prominent historians have written many different accounts of the events of 
Karbala. The concern here is not with the historical accuracy of the narratives that profess 
to recount the details of this battle. The purpose of retelling the historical point of view is 
to depict what the Shia has considered to be the “correct” representations of this event.  
The most commonly accepted narratives of the Battle of Karbala begin with the 
Prophet’s grandson Hussein receiving various letters from Muslims living in southern 
Iraq asking him to come to their assistance and rid them of the tyrannical rule of the 
caliph Yazid. The Prophet’s grandson Hussein, who at the time lived in Mecca after his 
flight from Medina, received various letters from Muslims living in Kufa. These letters 
urged him to lead the Kufans into revolt against Yazid and assured him of their loyalty 
and allegiance.37  
Kufa was a unique place, and the Kufans a peculiar people. When Ali became the 
forth caliph he shifted his capital from Medina to Kufa, and ever since that city became 
the home of those who claimed partisanship of the Ahl al-Bayt. At the time of 
Muawiyah’s death, Kufa was still very strongly pro Alid. Thus, when the opportunity 
arose to battle Yazid, the Kufans, who still regarded themselves as the Shia (supporters) 
of the Ahl al-Bayt, turned to Hussein to lead them. Just as Yazid’s father, Muawiyah, 
faced Hussein’s father, Ali, in battle two decades earlier, Hussein and Yazid were rival 
contenders for leadership of the Muslim community. 
                                                 
37 Husain S. Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam (Librairie du Liban, Bierut, 1979), 
177-180. 
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Imam Hussein left Mecca for Kufa with all his family including his little children 
counting on the support of the Kufans. According to most sources, his entourage had a 
small group of relatives and followers capable of fighting. His fighting men consisted of 
thirty-two horsemen and forty-foot soldiers. Other authorities fix the number at forty-five 
horsemen and one hundred foot soldiers.38 
Hussein arrived in an empty desert named Karbala, located near the Euphrates 
River in Southern Iraq on Thursday the second of Muharram in the year of 680 AD. The 
Governor of Kufa, Ibn Zayd, under the orders of Yazid sent four thousand men to 
intercept Hussein and his followers.39 Ibn Zayd’s men arrived on the third of Muharram 
under the command of Umar Ibn Saad and prevented Hussein and his followers from 
reaching the river. Ibn Saad, who was a Qurayshi, the son of one of the Prophet’s 
companion, Saad b. Abi Waqqas, was trying to persuade the governor of Kufa to find 
some peaceful means to avoid shedding the blood of the grandson of the Prophet, but his 
requests were all in vain. Yazid was getting impatient with this delay. He kept pressuring 
Ibn Zayd to bring the matter to a quick conclusion.  Umar Ibn Saad stationed a force of 
five hundred cavalry on the road to the river, and for three days before the massacre on 
the tenth of Muharram, Hussein and his companions suffered terribly from thirst. Even 
under such brutal conditions, Hussein refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid.40 
Fear of being let down by Ibn Saad, Ibn Zayd decided to prod him to finish the 
job by sending another commander named Shamir Ibn Dhul Jawshan (commonly written 
as Shimr) with the orders that if Ibn Saad feels any restraint in dealing with Hussein, 
Shamir should depose him and take charge to end the matter quickly and effectively. Ibn 
Saad got the message. He did not want to lose his command neither the accompanying 
awards.41  
                                                 
38 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islām: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Āshūrā in Twelver 
Shī’ism, 105; Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam, 189. 
39 Ibid., 109. 
40 Ibid., 110. 
41 Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam, 188. 
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Soon after receiving these new orders on the evening of the ninth of Muharram, 
Ibn Saad delivered a final ultimatum to Hussein. Hussein asked for a day’s respite, which 
was granted. At this point Hussein assembled his relatives and supporters and delivered a 
speech. This speech is unanimously reported in the events of the night of Ashura by the 
sources through different authorities, and it proves a useful tool in understanding 
Hussein’s thinking. He said:42 
I give praise to God who has honored us with the Prophethood, has taught 
us the Quran, and favored us with His religion ….I know of no worthier 
companions than mine; may God reward you with all the best of His 
reward. I think tomorrow our end will come… I ask you all to leave me 
alone and to go away to safety. I free you from your responsibilities for 
me, and I do not hold you back. Night will provide you a cover; use it as a 
steed…You may take my children with you to safe their lives. 
Hussein supporters refused to leave their beloved leader behind. They showed an 
unshakable loyalty and supported him wholeheartedly and enthusiastically despite the 
crippling thirst and their looming death. They spent their last night praying, reciting the 
Quran, and worshiping God. 
On the morning of Ashura, the day of the massacre, Hussein went out of the camp 
and saw Umar Ibn Saad mobilizing his troops to start the hostility. He stared at the 
intimidating army, and as large as it was Imam Hussein showed no signs of compromise. 
Imam Hussein raised his hands in prayer:43  
O God, you are my only Trust in every calamity; you are my only hope in 
every hardship; you are the only promise in the anxiety and distress in 
which hearts become weak and (human) actions becomes slight, in which 
one is deserted and forsaken by his own friends, and in which the enemies 
take malicious pleasure and rejoice at his misfortunes. O God, I submit 
myself to You; my complaint is to You alone against my enemies, and to 
You alone is my desire and request. Who else other than you can relieve 
me from grief (sic). You alone are the custodian of every blessing and the 
Master of every excellent and the last resort for every desire. 
                                                 
42 Jafri, Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam, 188. 
43 Ibid., 189. 
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The decisive battle finally took place in which each and every male member in 
Hussein’s small entourage was martyred fighting in the battlefield with the exception of 
one of Hussein sons, Ali (Zin Al-Abidin) who was seriously ill and did not take part in 
the fighting. He was spared when Zaynab, Hussein’s sister covered him under her arms 
and Ibn Saad protected him from Shamir’s sword.44 Hussein was left alone, one man 
against thousands. He took them on, fighting them bravely, and kept fighting, receiving 
many wounds in the process. Thousands of enemy fighters were surrounding him but 
none dared to move toward him to deliver the final blow. Finally, it was Shamir who 
advanced with a small group of soldiers, but even he did not dare to deliver the final blow 
on Hussein. At last, the son of Ali rose and threw himself on the Umayyads. Attacked 
from every side, Hussein finally fell face down on the ground just in front of his tent and 
was beheaded while the women and children watched the dreadful scene.45 The tragic 
day has since been known as Ashura, the tenth of the month of Muharram.   
After the battle of Karbala, all the male members of Hussein were beheaded and 
all their heads, including Hussein’s, were taken as trophies to Yazid in Damascus, while 
the female members of the party were taken captive along with Hussein’s son, Ali. As the 
women were carried away to Kufa, they passed the corpses of the dead, still lying on the 
sand. Zaynab cried out in lamentation:46 
O my Muhammad, on you the angels of heaven prayed. Behold Hussein 
naked under the sky, soiled with his blood and dismembered. O my 
Muhammad, your daughters are captives, and your male descendants lying 
dead blown about by the wind. 
2. Pietistic Point of View 
The above historical events surrounding the battle of Karbala are clear and well 
documented; however, their pietistic interpretation may not always be as clear. The battle 
of Karbala soon became the event of central significance to the entire Shia theology. Its 
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details became highly elaborated upon and surrounded with numerous non-historical 
embellishments. While any academic historian of Shia will present the details of this 
history, it is only the event as seen through the eye of the believer or Shia piety that can 
give it the spiritual dimension felt by the Shia. 
The battle of Karbala is considered by Shia piety to be as important in the 
religion’s history of Muslims as the battle of Badr.47 It is believed that the martyrs of 
Badr are favored by God and were supported by host of angels. Those same angels came 
to Hussein on his way from Medina to Mecca and offered to lend him supports, as God 
had commanded them. However, he told them to witness his death and guard his tomb 
until the coming of the Mahdi (the Twelve Imam).48 
Shia piety also believes that God is supposed to have chosen one thousand men 
who would protect His religion from the beginning of the world until its end. Three 
hundred and thirteen men accompanied and defended Talut,49 Three hundred and thirteen 
men fought in Badr, and at the end of time, it is believed that three hundred and thirteen 
men will support the Mahdi. That leaves only sixty-one men; these were the companions 
of Hussein. Thus, God chose the men who fought and died with Hussein for this honor 
before the creation of the world. They faced death but God protected them against pain as 
he did the martyrs of Badr.50 
Shia piety has viewed the Battle of Karbala as a divinely preordained event. It 
believes that Hussein knew beforehand that his opposition would be futile. It also  
 
 
                                                 
47 The Battle of Badr was fought in 624 CE in the Hejaz of western Arabia, was a key battle in the 
early days of Islam and a turning point in Muhammad's struggle with his opponents among the Quraysh in 
Mecca. It is one of the few battles specifically mentioned in the Muslim holy book, the Quran. 
48 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islām: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Āshūrā in Twelver 
Shī’ism, 124. 
49 Talut marched with his soldiers to confront Jalut (Goliath), the small force of Talut including 
Dawud. Jalut's army was larger than Talut's but was able to win as mentioned in the Quran (Al-Baqarah 
2:251). 
50 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islām: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Āshūrā in Twelver 
Shī’ism, 125. 
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believes that Hussein’s defeat in Karbala was not the result of a fluke or some lapse on 
his part as a military leader, had he wanted, he could have avoided entrapment outside 
Kufa.       
If Hussein’s foreknowledge is preordained, the entire meaning of the event 
changes. Instead of being a failed military coup inspired by a desire to seize power and 
rectify political wrongs, the event becomes a moral play whose primary intent is to 
demonstrate a higher truth. By advancing to certain defeat, Hussein was testifying to his 
followers that their cause was one so important and vital to merit their dying for it.51 
Furthermore, his voluntary death was not simply a demonstration for the benefit of his 
contemporaries, but rather presented further proof for all future generations of what 
exactly the Prophet Muhammad's teachings meant for Muslims: piety is more important 
than temporal power, and only a just ruler is a Muslim one. Karbala casts a shadow 
forward in time: those today that choose to come together as a Shia to honor the Imams 
will be tested and suffer prosecution for their loyalty just as were the companions of 
Hussein. Thus God underscores the pivotal importance of Karbala by patterning world 
events in every age, past, present, and future, so as to conform with events of the seventh 
century.  
The tragedy of Karbala, which was in the words of Ayatollah Khomeini the 
symbol of blood's triumph-the blood of the martyrs-over the sword, transformed not only 
the history of Shia but also human history forever. Khomeini viewed the battle of Karbala 
not as limited to any particular period of time but a continuing struggle in the “Eternal 
Now.”52  
In one of Khomeini's statements delivered in Qom on the first night of Muharram, 
he stated:53  
                                                 
51 Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islām: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Āshūrā in Twelver 
Shī’ism, 121-123. 
52 Sayid Wahid Akhtar, “Karbala: An Enduring Paradigm of Islamic Revivalism,” Al-Tawhid 13, no. 1 
(Spring 1996).  
53 Jafariyanews website, http://www.jafariyanews.com/oct2k2/4_marajeazadari.htm (accessed May 
10, 2008). 
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…From among the factors of integrity of Muslim nation in general and 
Shia school of thought in particular the great and most important factor is 
incident of Karbala of the grandson of Prophet. It is a fact that the son of 
Zahra has got the religion insured forever. Brother of Zaynab has got 
Islam insured with his deed. He has given protection to Islam from all 
aspects. The uprising and the movement that you (Imam Hussein) initiated 
and the battle in which he himself was martyred but overthrew Umayyad 
concepts, the protection of this battle, movement and uprising is 
necessary. If we want to make our state and its freedom permanent then 
we have to protect this secret… 
Shia believes that freedom is at the core of Imam Hussein’s message. The Imam 
fought for freedom of all humanity. He fought against hunger, poverty, tyranny, 
exploitation and injustice. He knowingly chose death because it was the Will of God. In 
his speech delivered before his journey to Iraq, he spoke of his choice in the following 
words:54 
O God, You know that we did not seek, in what we have done, acquisition 
of power, or ephemeral possessions. Rather, we seek to manifest the truths 
of Your religion and establish righteousness in Your lands, so that the 
wronged among Your servants may be vindicated, and that men may abide 
by the duties (fara'id), laws (sunan) and Your ordinances (ahkam). 
E. SUMMARY 
The purpose of the above description of the schism between Sunni and Shia is not 
meant to provide all the dissimilarities between the two sects, but rather to touch on the 
main contentious points while focusing on the political and legal systems, ritual practices, 
and theological doctrines.  
Though minor details may differ between Shia historians, the above account is a 
fairly representative story of the death of Hussein and its surrounding circumstances as 
well as a fair depiction of the pietistic sentiment felt by the Shia piety. Most importantly, 
nearly all versions of the Battle of Karbala share the strikingly similar characteristics in 
telling of the bravery and piety of Hussein and his followers, the betrayal of his sworn 
supporters in Kufa, the immoral brutality of Hussein’s enemies and their disdain for the 
                                                 
54 Akhtar, “Karbala: An Enduring Paradigm of Islamic Revivalism.”  
 23
family of the Prophet and his followers, and most importantly, the belief of the divinely 
preordained outcome of the battle with Hussein’s foreknowledge of his demise and the 
demise of his followers. These characteristics, which have been abstracted, amplified, 
and cherished by Shia since 680 AD have given Shia its distinct personality.  
 24
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III. ASHURA RITUAL DESCRIPTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The collective memory of the tragedy of Karbala, combined with later historical, 
political, and ideological trends in the Muslim world, has produced and shaped the rituals 
associated with Shiism today. Al-ta’ziya,55 as the Ashura rituals are generally called, have 
evolved from a rudimentary practice of few pious Shia spontaneously gathering to lament 
the loss of their beloved Imam through oral depiction of the Karbala tragedy and visits to 
the Imam’s Shrine into a very vibrant and colorful practice which have become the most 
extraordinary acts of devotion in the Islamic world.56 
In this chapter, the five major Ashura rituals will be described including the 
memorial services (majalis al-ta’ziya), the visitation of Hussein’s tomb in Karbala 
particularly on the occasion of the 10th day of the month of Muharram and the 40th day 
after the battle (ziyarat Ashura and ziyarat arba‘in), the public mourning processions (al-
mawakib al-husayniyya), the representation of the battle of Karbala in the form of a play 
(tashabih), and the self-flagellations (zangeel and tatbir). A description of other rituals 
ingrained with these major rituals will also be presented, such as chest beating (latm), 
recitation of Karbala narratives (qira’ah) by a reciter (qari or khateeb), and niyahah 
(recitation of rhythmic lamentation poetry).57 
This depiction of Ashura rituals will be presented in the form that they are 
currently practiced. A historical study and evolution of Ashura ritual will be addressed in 
the next chapter and will concentrate on the form and content.  
 
                                                 
55 Taziyeh means literally “mourning,” the expression of condolence. For the Shiite sect of Islam, it 
has a further meaning: lamentation for martyred imams, or leaders of the faith. In particular, taziyeh means 
mourning for Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. The third definition of Taziyeh concerns the 
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1. Majalis Al-ta’ziya 
The term majlis (plural majalis) in a strict sense means a meeting, a session, or a 
gathering. In reference to al-ta’ziya, majlis means a gathering to mourn Imam Hussein.58 
The majalis al-ta’ziya, as currently held, take place during the first ten days of the 
month of Muharram. These mourning gathering rituals start in the evening and last late 
into the night. They are mostly held in congregation halls known as Husainiyyat, but can 
also be held in private homes large enough to accommodate sizeable groups. They are 
usually designated for male mourners, but in some areas, female Husainiyyat also exist. 
During the majalis, mourners go through exhaustive emotional fluctuations as they listen 
to the tragic recitation of Karbala narratives (qira’ah) by a reciter (qari or khateeb). In 
many cases, these reciters are professional paid orators specializing in the art of reciting 
and are masters of spawning grief among the mourners.59 
During the first ten days of Muharram, the Karbala narratives are recited based on 
the chronological order of the events that took place during the first ten days of 
Muharram in 680 AD, leaving the beheading of Hussein narrative as the last and the most 
painful climax of the Karbala tragedy.60 
While the narratives are recited, they are interrupted by niyahah (recitation of 
rhythmic lamentation poetry) at specific climactic moments. This rhythmic poetry is in 
the form of classical stanza, occasionally recited but often wailed. The niyahah is 
accompanied by latm (chest beating) and has a rhythmic hypnotizing effect, which 
focuses attention and facilitates a more intense weeping activity. The niyahah is, in turn, 
interrupted by the return to the narrative recitation also at the right emotional moments 
judged by the reciter before the mourners beat themselves or weep too heavily. This cycle 
between emotional crescendo of narrative recitation and physical crescendo of chest 
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beating continues intermittently throughout the mourning gatherings until the account of 
the slaying of the Prophet’s grandson, Hussein, marks the apex of the emotional grief.61 
With the exception of the recitation of Karbala narratives by the reciter, which is 
specific to the majalis al-ta’ziya, all the other ingrained rituals including the chest beating 
(latm) and the niyahah are practiced during other major Ashura rituals. The niyahah and 
latm are practiced during the ceremonial march (al-mawakib al-husayniyya) that occurs 
on the tenth day of Muharram and on the visitation of Hussein’s tomb in Karbala on the 
fortieth day after the battle (arba‘in) commemorations. 
2. Ziyarat Ashura and Ziyarat Arba‘in 
The visitation of Hussein’s tomb on the tenth of Muharram and on the occasion of 
the fortieth day after the battle of Karbala are considered one of the major Ashura rituals, 
strengthening the spiritual ties between Shia and their beloved Hussein. Karbala is 
considered the site for such a ritualistic pilgrimage since it is the site where Hussein was 
beheaded. 
As currently practiced, the visitation of Hussein’s tomb follows prescribed 
directives. These directives involve the recitation of specific sanctified text in a precise 
manner and at specific points within Hussein’s shrine. The Mourner goes through 
ritualized motions and sayings that are to be performed first at the entrance of the shrine, 
then at the foot of Hussein’s grave, and finally at the head of his grave. These ritualized 
motions and sayings within the major visitation ritual are very elaborate and precise, 
elevating the ziyarat Ashura and ziyarat arba‘in rituals almost into the level of 
fundamental prayer such as Salat. The mourner first must stand in front of the shrine, 
recite a precisely defined oration, and then enter the shrine. Once inside the shrine and 
when the mourner is ready to offer supplication, he or she must first rise to an upright 
standing posture, face the direction of Karbala, and bow the head in humility and recite  
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the prescribed text. For those unable to make the pilgrimage to Karbala due to financial 
or health reasons, reciting the specific sanctified text is viewed as an acceptable 
alternative for actual presence at Karbala.62  
3. Al-Mawakib al-Husayniyya 
One of the most visible rituals practiced by the Shia is the public mourning 
processions (Al-mawakib al-husayniyya). The mourning processions are displayed in 
main streets in villages and cities allowing everyone to actively participate and are held 
mostly on the 10th of Muharram and on the arba‘in. The size of the procession can be 
anywhere from several dozen to several thousand men and boys parading the streets 
holding banners and carrying models of the mausoleum of their martyrdom, Hussein and 
his followers. Numerous more men, women, and children follow behind, flanking both 
sides of the procession.63 
The models of Hussein mausoleums are meticulously built with passion and love 
in mind for Hussein. They vary in size, but must be light enough to be carried or wheeled 
in the procession. The glittering mausoleums are adorned with lights and draped with 
black cloth to symbolize mourning and green cloth, the color of virtue and of the Garden 
of Paradise, to represent the family of the Prophet.  
In elaborate processions, good and evil characters from the Karbala narratives are 
displayed with traditional customs of the old time. Horses and camels are decorated and 
used by the characters of the narratives. The marchers carry banners, flags, and floats, 
singing dirges and laments, all interspersed, sometimes with shirtless men. Leading the 
procession is a chanter who recites elegy over an electrically powered loudspeaker that is 
pulled in a wagon along with a generator. In front of the processions, there are usually 
large and heavy banners, such as the alam, in addition to black flags adorning religious 
phrases. Accompanying the marchers are Drummers and youths playing tambourines, 
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filling the air with passion, and beating basic rhythms in coordination with the lead 
chanter.64  The devoted followers march with a deliberate tempo to a slow and strong 
beat. The niyahah, latm, and in many cases self-flagellation are performed within the 
procession. 
4. Tashabih 
The narratives of the Battle of Karbala have not only been used in the form of 
mourning recitation during the majalis al-ta’ziya, but have also been reenacted in the 
form of theatrical rituals embellished with tragically graphic details. The Tashabih, as it 
is called, is a dramatic recreation, often entirely in verse, of selected scenes of the events 
of Karbala. Furthermore, it is not merely an exercise in religious narration, but a 
performance that meshes educational schemes with a theatrical boost to visualize the 
passion of Imam Hussein for a lay audience. In this, they learn the virtues of Imam 
Hussein's life, notions of right and wrong and the power of heavenly justice. 
The Tashabih usually consists of large casts of professional and amateur actors, a 
director, a staging area, elaborate costumes, and props are utilized with viewers sitting 
passively as spectators lamenting the passion play.  It is considered expensive to stage 
and must have financial backing by either the state, wealthy individuals, or organizations 
such as the guilds or neighborhood associations.65 
The most elaborate Tashabih are performed in dedicated structures called takyeh 
by professional actors performing elaborately realistic scenes utilizing time-accurate 
costumes, caparisoned camels and horses with Yazid’s in yellow and Hussein’s in green, 
and the music of trumpets and kettle drums. The play opens with Hussein and his 
followers traveling through the desert of Karbala to Kufa, and ends with the emotional 
massacre of Hussein and his followers. During the play, the audience is often passive; 
however, they do cry, shout, and chant when necessary.66 
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Variants of the Tashabih rituals are also performed in popular processions or any 
open space. These plays are usually performed by amateur actors from the neighborhood 
using ill-decorated scenes and rely mostly on the verbal skills rather than the physical 
acting skills of the actors.67 
5. Self-flagellation 
Self-flagellation is one of the most controversial and the most conspicuous 
Ashura rituals, and it has been the source of fear and hostility toward Shia, especially 
from the Sunni sect. This ritual practice is viewed even within many Shia religious circles 
as an anathema.68 However, for some Shia believers, it is viewed as another way of 
expressing grief and experiencing the pain inflicted on their beloved Imam during the 
Battle of Karbala.  
Self-flagellation is usually held on the eight, ninth, and tenth of the month of 
Muharram and is performed in a group liturgical setting usually during the public 
mourning procession (Al-mawakib al-husayniyya) rather than in private by a single 
individual. When it is performed during the public mourning procession, it is performed 
to the rhythmic beat of the drums with the self-flagellating mourners in unison 
synchronizing their strike on self.  
Self-flagellations are most often practiced by young men, and over time, the 
different forms of self-flagellations have become so complex that the act has evolved into 
part art and part sport. One can even find vendors selling different self-flagellation 
instruments and enthusiast discussing different techniques.  
Many different types of self-flagellation are performed depending on the type of 
instruments used and the location of the cut in the body. Naked razor blades and hand 
size wooden discs with nail studs are used to inflict lacerations on the chest; zangeel 
(metal chains) with or without blades are used to inflict lacerations on the back, and tatbir 
in which knives and short swords are used to inflict lacerations on the head. The most 
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widely used form of self-flagellation is cutting with a naked razor blade. This is 
performed by inserting the razor blade between the fingers of the right hand. With an 
open palm and stiffened fingers, the mourner beats his breast allowing the cutting edge of 
the blade to lacerate his chest with each stroke. These practices vary from one country to 
another. The zangeel is another self-flagellation instrument used for lacerating the back. 
It consists of a scourge or flail with chains connecting four to five six-inch metal blades 
to a wooden handle. With legs apart, the mourner lifts his left hand high into the air, and 
the zangeel is held in the right hand. He swings the flail horizontally at his chest so that 
the blade lacerates his exposed back. The movement accompanies the rhythm of the 
reciter’s chanting and the drums. It is also possible to use the zangeel without blades in 
order to lessen the intensity of the lacerations on the back. A mourner can also use knives 
or short swords to lacerate the scalp and forehead. Once blood flow is induced from the 
lacerations, the mourner wraps his head with a long white bandage and wears it 
throughout Ashura.69 
6. Latm 
Latm is a ritual that involves mourners beating their chest with their hands only. It 
is less controversial than self-flagellation and more widely practiced. Latm is similar to 
self-flagellation in regard to being performed in a group liturgical setting rather than in 
private by a single individual.  It is performed in time to a rhythm determined by the 
chanting of a lamentation poem, and is ingrained within other major Ashura rituals 
performed during the majalis al-ta’ziya and mourning procession (Al-mawakib al- 
husayniyya).  
The style of the latm performed often varies depending on the group sponsoring 
the act. Styles can range from the very simple and least physically exhaustive, often 
performed by middle aged and elderly mourners, which involves the mourner simply 
striking his breast over the heart with the open palm of the right hand to the most 
physically demanding form of latm which consist of the mourner raising both hands over 
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the head and dropping them forcefully, striking the chest with both hands. Young men 
due to the physical strength required to pound the chest with enough force to create a 
percussion that can echo for long distances often practice this form of latm.70 There are 
also styles of latm that are more choreographed and performed by large groups of 
mourners. During this practice, the mourners line up side-by-side in two parallel lines, 
and with a left hand on the hip of the man to his left, each mourner strikes his chest with 
his right hand in time to the chanted niyahah. In unity with the rhythm, the mourners step 
together, taking a pace to the front, and then one to the back, ending with all of them 
bending forward in unison while beating their chests.71 
The varying styles of latm offer each group of mourners the opportunity to 
identify and characterize both itself and other groups. Oftentimes, there is a very 
competitive spirit between different groups of mourners who strive to prove which group 
can mourn more intensely than the other. Such competitiveness can sometimes lead to 
quarrels between members of different groups.  
B. SUMMARY 
The above description of the Ashura rituals currently practiced among world Shia 
communities focuses on the main Ashura rituals as well as the ingrained rituals that often 
occur within the main rituals. The attempt in this section is to describe the different forms 
of rituals. There are obviously differences based among different ethnic groups, different 
social groups, different communities, and even within the same communities. These 
difference, however, are superficial and do not change the form of ritual described above. 
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IV. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ASHURA RITUALS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since their early inception, the Ashura rituals have evolved and passed through 
various stages until they reached the present form and content in which they are held 
today. It is believed that from their institution to the present, Ashura rituals have passed 
through three major stages, represented by the historical and cultural epochs through 
which the Muslims in general, and the Shia in particular, have lived. These three major 
stages can be divided into smaller stages representing the prevailing dynasties and their 
impact on the development and propagation of Ashura rituals.72 
The three major stages share similar fixed elements of the rites of remembrance 
but differ in the form and content of these rites. These fixed elements are present in all 
three major stages and consist of the story of the Karbala massacre as discussed on the 
previous chapter and the criticism of the authorities when reason for that criticism exists.   
In this chapter, a thorough depiction of the three major stages will be presented. 
The first stage began shortly after the Battle of Karbala in year 680 AD, and it continued 
until the fall of Baghdad at the hands of Hulagu. The second stage began at the fall of 
Baghdad and continued through the Muslim dark ages until the modern period. The third 
and final stage was from the beginnings of the modern period until the present.73 Within 
these major stages, relevant dynasties that impacted the Ashura rituals, such as Umayyad, 
Abbasid, Buyids, Fatmids, Safavid, and Qajar will be discussed.  
1. First Stage 
The first stage of Ashura ritual started shortly after the Battle of Karbala (year 680 
AD) and it continued until the fall of Baghdad at the hands of Hulagu. In this stage, the 
fixed elements, namely the account of the tragedy and criticism of authorities during the 
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Umayyad and the Abbasid period, were not performed in the open fear of prosecution. 
After the Abbasids, the rites of remembrance were held in public and the criticism of the 
Umayyad and Abbasids took place openly without arising any opposition from the actual 
authorities. This criticism, however, was devoid of any political content.    
During this stage, the form of Ashura rituals acquired a fixed time and became a 
cultural activity. This stage connected time with memory of the massacre of Hussein. The 
first ten days of the lunar month of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic year, 
became etched in posterity as the times all Shia must lament and if possible make 
pilgrimages to Hussein’s grave in Karbala.  In this early stage, the rite of remembrance 
began in the form of simple conversations about what transpired in the Battle of Karbala.  
Then the conversations transformed into a story that was reported or a poem that was 
recited, and then there arose a written text of the account of the death of Hussein. At the 
end of this stage a form began to emerge in which poetry and prose were integrated.74 
Prose tells the story of the tragedy in the spirit of giving an account of history and virtues 
and with only a limited amount of emotional expressions. Poetry colors the story and 
endows it with a sad, tragic artistic quality.  
During this stage, the content of the rituals was more focused on the details and 
historical background of the tragedy, matter associated with the succession to the 
Prophet, and the policies that were followed during the reign of Uthman (third caliph) 
and the Umayyad Empire. This stage also began to focus on the virtues and the 
outstanding position of the Imams of the Holy Family as well as focus on their sufferings 
and the suffering of other Shia.75 
During this stage, four major dynasties impacted the development of the rites of 
remembrance of Hussein. 
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a. Umayyad Period 
The Umayyad period represents the embryonic phase in the historical 
development of the Ashura rituals. This period held witness to the Battle of Karbala and 
the inception of Ashura rituals budding from the first known visit to Hussein’s grave and 
the subsequent establishment of the annual commemoration of Hussein’s death. 
Soon after the Battle of Karbala, local people probably performed the 
earliest manifestation of grief for Hussein and his followers in the form of mourning 
gathering. This was alluded to by some references describing the first visit to Hussein and 
his fallen followers’ graves by the surviving and returning prisoners of Hussein’s camp. 
The references indicate that when the prisoners of Hussein’s camp returned from Yazid’s 
court at Damascus, they stopped in Karbala on their way to Medina to pay their respects 
at the grave of Hussein. They reached the site forty days after the battle and were 
surprised to see that people were already gathering to mourn Hussein. It was reported that 
during this first visit to Hussein’s grave, Zaynab, Hussein’s sister, who was among the 
prisoners, had given a speech praising Hussein and cursing his killers. Zaynab also 
recited a heartfelt oration that moved even the Umayyad troops to tears.76 This first visit 
is considered by Shia as the root of many Ashura rituals. It represents the first reference 
in the literature to any type of group gathering to mourn Hussein’s death. It represents the 
basis for the forty-day pilgrimage rituals currently known as arba‘in commemorations. 
Furthermore, this first visit along with Zaynab’s speech represents a precedent for majalis 
al-ta’ziya and for the origin of what would become rawzeh khwani. Moreover, during this 
first visit, there were accounts of women mourning by beating their chest (latm) and 
wailing, which were and are still natural emotional reactions among mourners of this 
region. This sort of chest beating (latm) is believed to be the precursor for the highly 
ritualized rhythmic chest beating rituals practiced today.77   
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The first references of the accounts of the annual commemoration of 
Hussein’s death were attributed to the tawwabun. The tawwabun were a group of people 
most of whom were Kufans who said to have been deeply regretful that they were unable 
to present support to Hussein at Karbala. They gathered at the site of Hussein’s grave and 
together they mourned his death and the fact that they were not there to die alongside 
him. The tawwabun also composed and recited poetry that praised Hussein, and all the 
while agreed to reunite in the future to avenge his death against the Umayyad forces, 
which they eventually did years later.78  
These accounts of the tawwabun, meeting on the annual anniversary of 
Hussein’s death in Karbala marks the earliest evidence of annual commemoration. The 
ziyarah (ritual grave visitation), developed more fully in the Abbasid period. It later 
became a highly ritualized aspect of the Muharram commemoration ceremonies. Its 
historical and literary roots were in tawwabun. Furthermore, it was also the first evidence 
of the beginning of the niyahah, or poetic lamentation rituals. 
During this early period of Ashura rituals, birth and development 
witnessed during the reign of the Umayyads, rituals practices were relatively private 
among the small Shia communities. These small Shia communities were prosecuted by 
the antagonistic and politically dominant Umayyads who tried to erase their heinous 
crime by instituting a special festival holiday on the day of Ashura that is still practiced in 
many Muslim countries such as Morocco. Despite such attempt of neutralizing the 
commemoration of Hussein’s death, the majalis were held in the home of the Shia imam 
(religious leader) or other influential Shia figures. These private annual gatherings during 
Ashura were successful in keeping the memory of Hussein alive not only in form but also 
in content through oral transmission of accounts of the battle, the events leading up to it, 
and its aftermath. 
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b. Abbasid Period 
The Karbala narratives were used by the politically savvy Abbasids to 
incite revolution and the overthrow of the Umayyad Empire. The Early Abbasid rulers 
found it useful to bestow their patronage on the rites of Ashura. They understood that 
Karbala narrative had rebellious antigovernment connotations and they used it to their 
advantage. By their early reign, the memorial services such as majalis were no longer 
confined to only private homes concealed from the public, but rather began to be held in 
public mosques.79 This initial support by the early Abbasid rulers resulted in a plethora of 
literary accounts documenting the oral transmissions that were safeguarded by Shia 
during the Umayyad period. It also resulted in the popularity of Ashura public rituals 
such as the pilgrimage ritual to Karbala (ziyarah), which resulted in the expansion of 
Karbala pilgrimage economy, in the dramatic increase of visiting pilgrims, and in the 
popularity of Hussein and the Battle of Karbala among both Shia and Sunni 
communities.80 
By the ninth century, the Abbasid, who were in full control of the empire, 
felt threatened by Hussein symbolism and turned against Hussein’s commemoration 
rituals. Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–61 AD) destroyed the shrine of Hussein, 
razed Karbala, and banned visitation of the site on pain of death.81 This act of vandalism 
is proof to the extent that the ritualistic visitation of Hussein’s shrine had developed. It is 
also a possible indication that by then, ziyarah had already developed into a much more 
ritualized act than simply visiting a grave. This act also shows the popularity of Hussein 
among all Muslim, Shia or Sunni. In fact, historical accounts of the events at the Battle of 
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who depicted the Battle of Karbala in the same perspectives as early Shia narrators. 
Sunni, however, did not hold the importance of the battle of Karbala in the same level as 
Shia, who saw it as central to their identity.82 
c. Buyid Period 
During the tenth century, the Abbasid caliph saw his authority decline and 
became a leader with no temporal power within the state. The Buyids, a local Shia 
dynasty in Western Iran, took control of Iraq and Iran. While accepting the titular 
authority of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, the Buyid rulers assumed effective control of 
the state. This provided the rites of remembrance of Hussein a fertile ground and freedom 
to evolve and be expressed openly in public. Among the important Buyid rulers who 
played a major role in strengthening Shia solidarity and legitimizing the Ashura practices 
was Muizz al-Dawlah Ibn Buwayh. It was under his reign that the first historical 
reference to a public procession was documented. Ibn al-Kathir, a famous 14th century 
Arab historian recounts:83 
On the tenth of Muharram of this year (963 AD/352 AH), Mu‘izz al-
Dawlah Ibn Buyeh, may God disgrace him, ordered that the markets be 
closed, and that the women should wear coarse woolen hair cloth, and that 
they should go into the markets with their faces uncovered and their hair 
disheveled, beating their faces and wailing over Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi 
Talib. The people of the Suunah could not prevent this spectacle because 
of the large numbers of the Shia and because of their increasing 
prominence, and because the Sultan was on their side.  
The accounts of Ibn al-Kathir also show the increased tensions and violence between 
Sunni and Shia during these public processions as he stated in one of his accounts:84 
On the tenth of Muharram this year the Shia celebrated the mourning of 
Hussein as they did the year before. The Shia and Sunnis fought violently 
among each other on this day, and much property was looted. 
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Such violence continued until the end of the Buyid dynasty and the arrival of the Saljuqs 
dynasty in 1055 AD. During the Buyids period, these public processions began to 
incorporate acts of breast beating (Latm), which were originally reserved to mourning the 
lost of love one or to grave visits.85 
d. Fatimid Period 
During the tenth century, the Fatimids also had challenged and reduced the 
temporal power of the Abbasid caliph. They were a Shia dynasty that ruled over varying 
areas of the Maghreb, Egypt, Sicily, and the Levant from 909 to 1171 AD. They were not 
as successful as the Buyids in their introduction and development of Shia 
commemoration rituals. They attempted for several years to enforce the adherence to 
Shia commemorations rituals such as public procession but resistance by the 
overwhelming Sunni majority was immense. Historical references indicate that al-Mu’izz 
li-Din Allah, a Fatimid leader, had sponsored public processions that included some of 
his military units. The mourners passed by the shrines of Kulthum and Nafisah reciting 
dirges and mourning for Hussein’s death. The Sunni populace, however, did not 
commemorate Hussein’s death and continued to conduct business as usual on the day of 
Ashura. This caused tensions between the small Shia community and the Sunni populace, 
which led to bloodshed. It was reported that on the day of Ashura in 1005 AD, a Shia was 
physically attacked and decapitated by a mob of Sunni in Cairo.86 
With growing tensions between Sunni and Shia, the Fatimids decided to cancel public 
processions, and the Ashura rituals became events of simply mourning and reciting 
poetry in the mosques, which was amenable to Sunni participation.  
e. Hamdanid Period 
The Hamdanid is another Shia dynasty that developed during the decline 
of the Abbasid Empire. It came to power in northern Iraq in 944 AD and eventually 
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extended its power to Syria and Mosul. They had temporarily contributed to the 
development of Shiism. Aleppo became a center for Shia jurisprudence just as it became 
a destination for Shia men of culture, scholars, and poets.87 Conditions in the Hamdanid 
resemble the conditions in the Fatimid control land. As with the Fatimids, the 
Hamdanid’s Ashura commemorations in Aleppo consisted of no more than simply 
mourning and reciting of poetry, far different from the Ashura commemorations 
performed by the Buyids.  
By the end of this stage, the favorable political situation in Iraq, Iran, 
Egypt, and other locations gave the rites of remembrance for Hussein a golden 
opportunity to become widespread. They became public under the protection of the state 
on most occasions. By the tenth century, mourning commemorations in Baghdad, 
Aleppo, and Cairo were held in mosques or in special places built especially for these 
observances called Husayniyyat. By the end of this stage, the memorial services and the 
visitation of Hussein’s tomb, which were the oldest vehicles for invoking the memory of 
Karbala, developed a high degree of formalization. The services incorporated acts of 
wailing and lamentation (niyahah), and were sometimes led by a poet or another person 
(qari or khateeb) whose function was to chant elegies and to read traditions and stories 
on the sufferings of the imams from the martyrdom (maqatil) literature, which was 
developing at that time. It is also quite likely that the evolution of formalized chest 
beating (latm) rituals to the rhythm of recited poetry can be traced to this stage.  
2. Second Stage 
The second stage began at the time of the fall of Baghdad and continued through 
the Muslim dark ages until the modern period. In this stage, the rites of remembrance 
preserved the fixed elements, namely the account of the tragedy and the criticism of the 
authorities. The criticism of the Umayyads and Abbasids was direct, as they no longer 
had any existence in the political life of Iraq, Iran, or other Islamic countries. Yet this 
clear direct criticism was merely words without any real content. It was a theoretical  
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criticism of something, which no longer existed. At this stage, the memory of Hussein 
had lost its political and social importance in alleviating the suffering of Shia living under 
despotic rulers and became solely concerned with the Hereafter.88 
The Ashura rituals, the days of memorial for celebrating the rites, the first ten 
days of Muharram and the fortieth day after the battle of Karbala, became permanent and 
more structured. People leading the rituals such as wailing chanters, reciters, and 
storytellers became more devoted to the ritual practices, more specialized, and more 
numerous. In this stage, latm, which was believed to be a custom introduced to the 
commemoration rituals by the Buyids as cited above, became a firm element in some of 
the rites of remembrance.89    
In Ashura rituals, the objective language used during the first stage to depict the 
details and historical background of the tragedy was compromised and became 
emotionally laden. It gave away to emotional contents whose intention was to arouse the 
mind and the emotions of the people attending the rituals of remembrance. The narration 
of events became particularly tolerant in accepting accounts that lack historical accuracy. 
Even the events that can be historically proven became more embellished. For example, 
there was an assertion that the Abbasid Caliph, al-Mutawakkil, continued to plough up 
the grave of Hussein for two decades; however, al-Mutawakkil served as Caliph for only 
fifteen years. Furthermore, the contents of Ashura rituals were no longer referring only to 
the life and martyrdom of Hussein. The contents expanded to include a discussion of the 
lives, virtues, and tragedies of the other Imams.90 
Many attributed the changes in the content of Ashura rituals to the dark time the 
Muslim world had suffered during this period. The Muslim world had seen political 
disintegration, economic backwardness, civil wars, famines and plagues. Many Muslims 
believed that such misery was God’s test and must be accepted. As a result of this 
resignation and acceptance of this misery, the memory of Hussein became an activity 
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concerned with death rather than life. It became an event concerned with bringing benefit 
to man in the grave rather than an incentive to make him change his miserable life. The 
story of the Battle of Karbala and Hussein’s martyrdom was meant to be a sacred verbal 
activity one recited in order to enter paradise. A great example was given by Sheikh al-
Turayhi in his work, al-Muntakhab, where he illustrated the attitude towards 
remembering Hussein. He stated: 91 
My brothers, you desire the noble mansion of Paradise and great reward. 
Then perpetuate your grief, your sadness and your sorrow for them. …By 
my life, nothing is more efficacious to attain great reward and remove 
dread punishment than the performance of the ritual of grieves and making 
tears flow because of the treachery and desertion done to the Holy Family 
at that time. 
Performing the Ashura rituals such as weeping, beating one’s chest, and even 
cursing the Umayyad became purely an activity concerned with the afterlife rather than a 
tool used to renounce the political implications of the Umayyad policy. The Shia men had 
begun to perform the rituals in remembrance for Hussein for the sake of storing their acts 
of piety.   
As far as poetry, the first stage of poetry also evolved from its primary focus on 
the Battle of Karbala into poetry of lamentation, more concerned about generating 
extreme weeping and deep sorrow in the heart of the participants than about historical 
events. The new poetry also began to focus on the virtue of the Holy Family, praising the 
Imams and their love ones. By the second stage this poetry became basic material in the 
rites of remembrance.92  
The rites of remembrance in this stage were subject to persecution and restrictions 
in nearly every part of the Islamic world. The Ayyubids who were Sunni overthrew the 
Shia Fatimids in Egypt and spread their power to Syria, northern Iraq, and other areas 
such as Mecca and Hejaz. Sectarian fanaticism against the Shia received government 
protection, which enabled persecution of Shia activities and especially the Ashura rituals. 
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For this reason, these activities were restricted to the sacred shrines in Iraq or where the 
rites of remembrance could be held in secret. The only area at this time that the rites of 
remembrance publicly flourished was in Iran after the Safavids came to power. In Iran 
Shiism became strong.93 
a. Safavid Period 
A major development in Shia rituals occurred with the establishment of 
the Safavid dynasty, which ruled Persia, a territory largely encompassing the modern 
state of Iran, from 1501 to 1722 AD. The Safavids established the greatest Iranian empire 
since the Islamic conquest of Persia and institutionalized the Twelver (Ithna Asharis, or 
Ja‘farais) school of Shia Islam as the official religion of their empire, marking one of the 
most important turning points in the history of Islam and of Ashura rituals. There was a 
mass conversion of Iranians to Shiism in the sixteenth century. The rulers made fairly 
liberal use of Shia symbols and rituals to define and legitimize their rule and to 
differentiate between their state and their Sunni rivals and its threats-Uzbeks in the east 
and the Ottomans in the west.94 This new improved hagiographic depiction of Hussein 
gave birth to a number of new commemoration rituals. One example of such a ritual is 
the tashabih, which is not only a ritual for which a specific architectural structure had 
been developed as described in Chapter III, but it is also clearly a new fashioned ritual 
that had not existed in the earliest historical sources.  The origin might have been the 
European Corpus Christi plays of the post Renaissance period, which reenacted various 
events in the passion of Christ culminating in his crucifixion and resurrection.95 Other 
unprecedented rituals that did not exist in the early historical sources include the violent 
blood shedding rituals of self-flagellation. No one knows exactly when and where knives, 
swords, and chains were first used by Shia mourners to shed their blood in 
commemoration of Hussein’s death. The earliest description of self-flagellation and 
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blood shedding came from accounts of travelers. Evliya Chelebi, an Ottoman traveler 
who visited Tabriz in 1640 AD and attended the observances of the tenth of Muharram 
described the event:96 
The finest show is in the variegated tent of the khan, where all the great 
men of Tabriz are assembled, and where a Hymn on the death of Hussein 
is recited…The hearers listen sighing and lamenting, but when the reciter 
arrives at the passage where Hussein is killed by Shmir, a curtain opens 
behind him, and a severed head and trunk of a body, representing that of 
the imam when dead, is thrown on the ground, when there rises such an 
uproar of cries and lamentations that everybody loses his wits. At this 
moment some hundred men mingle in the crowd with razors, with which 
they cut the arms and breasts of all loving believers, who desire to shed 
their blood on this day in remembrance of the bloodshed by the imam; 
they make such deep incisions and scars, that the ground appears as if it 
was blooming with tulips. Some thousands brand the marks and names of 
Hassan and Hussein on their heads, arms, and breasts. They then carry 
Hussein’s body away from the ground with much pomp, and finish the 
ceremony with great howlings.  
Many attributed the origin of self-flagellations to Turkoman tribes and Christian 
Armenians who converted to Shiism in the 16th century during the Safavid period. These 
new converts shed their blood for Hussein the same way the Christian Catholics self-
flagellated to mourn for the shedding of Christ’s blood.97 
Beside the new form of rituals introduced during the Safavids period such 
as tashabih and self-flagellation, a new genre of pious narratives appeared. It was based 
on an influential book titled Rowzat al-shohada (The Garden of Martyrs) composed by 
the popular religious orator, Hussein Vaiz Kashefi. His book became one of the main 
sources used in reciting the Karbala narratives due to its use of an innovative trend 
involving the fusion of various historical accounts, elegiac poems, theological tracts, and 
hagiographies into a composition of short narratives that combined to form a much larger 
narrative. Hussein Vaiz Kashefi’s book also expressed a complex set of sanctified 
doctrines that stressed the bravery, piety, and sacrifice of Hussein and his followers at 
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Karbala. Excerpts from the book also served as the basis for scripts that were used in 
rowzeh Khani (reading the rawzeh) sermons. These sermons eventually became one of 
the principal rituals of Shia throughout the world and bear the same name as Kashefi’s 
book.98 
The Safavid period was a very important period in the development of 
new Ashura rituals. To protect and distinguish themselves from their Sunni rivals, the 
Safavid advocated and supported a new model of Hussein that was not part of the earlier 
Shia theology. New commemoration rituals grew out of this new and improved 
hagiographic such as tashabih, self-flagellation, and rowzeh Khani. These rituals further 
developed and became part of the current Ashura rituals. 
3. Third Stage 
The third and final stage of the Ashura ritual evolution took place from the 
beginnings of the modern period, and it continued up to the present time. In this stage, the 
commemoration of Hussein’s death has witnessed developments in form and content of 
very great importance.  
In form, public performances of Ashura rituals have become more prevalent than 
in the past with increased security and freedom enjoyed by Shia in many of the 
communities in which they reside. In some areas, however, limitations have continued to 
be imposed on public commemoration rituals and the Shia are restricted to private rites of 
remembrance. In addition, the occasions for performing the rites of remembrance are no 
longer restricted to the first ten days of Ashura and to the day of arba‘in, but have 
become more prevalent throughout the year. They are held on the day of the memorial of 
the Prophet’s death, in memory of each of the eleven Imams and other important 
personalities from the Holy Family. These remembrances are referred to as “public rites 
of remembrance.” During these remembrances, the preacher reviews the life of the person 
being remembered. He tells of the oppression and tyranny that was instituted against him 
or her, and he recites praiseful and lamenting poetry in honor of that person. The preacher 
                                                 
98 Aghaie, The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’s Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran, 12.  
 46
concludes the rites of remembrance by mentioning Imam Hussein and parts of his 
struggle. Other types of remembrances referred to as “private rites of remembrance” are 
also held. They are held for personal reasons such as the celebration of a new house, the 
return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and other private occasions. The person holding 
these private rites of remembrances seeks the blessings through remembering God, the 
Prophet, and the Imams.  
Perhaps the most important shift in the evolution of Ashura rituals that have 
occurred during the third stage has been in the content of the rituals. This shift made the 
rites of remembrance for Hussein a very important force in the direction of society. The 
fixed elements, namely the account of the tragedy and criticism of the Umayyad, the 
Abbasid, and others who carried out unjust policies towards the Holy Family and their 
Shia have continued. However, during this stage, this criticism has become political, 
directed against existing political, social, and economical upheaval. The enemy can be 
external such as imperialism or internal such as pressure from local leaders. The subjects 
of discontent can be social injustice, political oppression, economic disparities, and any 
other contemporary social upheaval. This shift in the contents is believed to be due to the 
situation of the Muslim world during this stage, which has suffered bitter experiences 
from imperialism. The contents of the rites of remembrance, their political relevance, and 
how Shia leaders have used them during this stage will be discussed in detail in the last 
chapter of this research. 
Besides the major political shift in the content of the Ashura rituals, the content 
also got rid of historically unreliable accounts and embellishments. It has become more 
historically accurate. In the sermons, preachers no longer present speculations of some 
writers as if they are historical fact. In addition, preachers began using a well-known 
technique in Arabic Poetry called “leading up” which involved the preacher beginning 
with a discussion of the current social affairs that deal with social fragmentation and 





preacher then transitions into a discussion on the virtue of Islam and a call for Muslims to 
strive to be good Muslims. These discussions lead up to his final topic, which is the story 
of the Hussein martyrdom in Karbala.99 
During this stage, three major Shia governments, all in Iran, impacted the 
development of the rites of remembrance of Hussein. One of the three governments, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, is still in power and is still shaping the Ashura rituals.  
a. Qajar Period 
The Qajar dynasty is a Shia dynasty that ruled Iran from 1796 to 1925. To 
legitimize their rule, the Qajar Shahs sponsored and supported the Ashura rituals for a 
couple reasons. They wanted to encourage the Iranian spirit and have greater control over 
religions and clergy.  
During their period, the tashabih, the theatrical reenactment of the Battle 
of Karbala developed during the Safavid period, reached its zenith under the Qajar. It 
became more than a straightforward reenactment of the events in the Battle of Karbala 
and transformed into a complex melodrama with literary and artistic additions. Separate 
plays were written about individual heroes, new characters were created, and existing 
ones were transformed. Huge theaters such as the Takyeh Dowlat in Tehran were built to 
hold large spectators.100 
Self-flagellations that were introduced to Northern Iran during the Safavid 
period by Christians converts became wide spread throughout Iran and even made its way 
to Iraq by the nineteenth century.101 Samuel Benjamin, the first U.S. official diplomatic 
envoy to Iran, described self-flagellation in his memoirs as follows:102  
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I was in Tehran in 1884. Processions went through the streets showing 
severe emotion as never before. Suddenly, men wearing white clothes with 
knives presented themselves and passionately struck their heads with the 
knives. Blood flowed from the cuts they made and their knives until they 
were covered with blood. 
Sheikh Mulla Darbandi (d. 1869), a controversial Shia jurist, exhorted people to 
experience pain. He urged weeping, lamentations, and self-flagellation. In his book Asrar 
al-shahadah, which is very controversial and has been rejected by current Shia jurists, he 
includes uncommon rituals, not to be found in other accepted Shia Imam writings. 
b. Pahlavi Period 
The Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran from the crowning of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 
1925 to the overthrow of Reza Shah Pahlavi's son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979. Unlike the Qajar dynasty, who sponsored and supported 
Ashura rituals to legitimize their rule and control the Shia clergy, the Pahlavi shahs 
shunned Shia clergy and stopped the state sponsoring and supporting of Ashura rituals. 
They stopped using Ashura rituals as the primary means of promoting their religious 
legitimacy and maintaining bonds with their subjects. They virtually abandoned support 
for the majalis. Reza Shah viewed Ashura rituals as a threat to his secular agenda and to 
his rule and sought to eliminate them from public sphere. This lack of financial support 
from the state contributed significantly to the decline of the Ashura ritual practices in 
contrast to the Qajar period. The Ashura rituals became mainly supported by 
neighborhood organizations such as merchants, ulama, landowners, and different guilds. 
The practice was limited to temporary ritual sites that were located on private property.  
This private support enabled the rituals to evolve on their own without 
state control. The emphasis in rituals shifted from sermons to lectures. Sermons, as the 
primary vehicle of expressions, however, were not displaced by lectures. These lectures 
began to place more emphasis on national and international issues and contributed 
significantly to national discourse. In 1963, Moharram, Khomeini repeatedly spoke  
against the government. His criticism of the governments among others included land 
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reform laws and women enfranchisements. In 1968, Mohammad Taqi Shariati another 
strong opponent of the Shah regime, spoke on “Role Models for Islamic Society.”103  
While the main theme of the sermons and lectures was religious piety or 
personal or community issues, political themes became woven into the sermons and 
lectures. As such sermons and lectures became a vehicle to inform the public about 
political issues.  This style of ritual became very prominent during the current 
government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
c. Iran Islamic Republic 
The revolutionary message of Hussein’s movement that began late during 
the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty has become the main language of the Ashura rituals in the 
current government of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The language has a more 
immediate and functional message, such as encouraging family planning, discouraging 
drug use, mobilizing the people for defense of the country, discouraging violations of 
hijab regulations, and so forth.  The language is intended to encourage the believers to act 
in accordance with those ideals. Every year during the month of Muharram, at least one 
major ritual protest was usually organized by a coalition of groups and organizations 
devoted to the ideal of revolution. 
The traditional Ashura rituals that tend to stress the abstract political 
aspect of the Hussein movement, along with religious ethics, social justice, and salvation 
are still practiced, but their importance to the government elites and revolutionary ulama 
is less. In fact, some form of Ashura rituals were banned such as the controversial ritual 
tatbir, in which mourners strike their heads with swords, producing blood and injuries.   
B. SUMMARY 
The historical examination of the development of Ashura rituals over a period of 
twelve centuries and under the influence of many dynasties has revealed that these  
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commemoration rituals have evolved in several distinct stages. They share similar fixed 
elements of Ashura rituals in the account of the tragedy and in the criticism of rulers, but 
the rituals differ in content and form at various times in history. 
During the first stage that began shortly after the Battle of Karbala (year 680 AD) 
and continued until the fall of Baghdad at the hands of Hulagu, the form of Ashura rituals 
acquired a fixed calendar and started as conversations, then changed to a story telling or a 
poem reciting, and finally they became a written account of the death of Hussein. At the 
end of this era, poetry and prose were integrated. During this time, the content of the 
rituals were focused on the details and historical background of the tragedy. By the end of 
this stage, the virtues and sufferings of the Imams of the Holy Family were incorporated.   
The Umayyad dynasty prevented any public gatherings and attempted to erase 
any memories of the Battle of Karbala.  The memories of the battle and the accounts of 
the first visit in the arba‘in, however, were kept alive in private or semiprivate circles 
largely through oral recitations recounting the battle. Many of the current forms of 
Ashura rituals were attributed to the first visit. 
The Abbasid coming to power relied on the rebellious antigovernment 
connotations of the Karbala narratives, which popularized the commemoration of 
Hussein’s death at Karbala among the mainstream Sunni community. This allowed the 
accounts previously restricted to oral transmission to be incorporated into the literary 
corpus, resulting in the incorporation of these largely Shia accounts into a plethora of 
mainstream Sunni literary and historical sources. In the waning period of Abbasid and 
during the Buyids, Fatimids, and Hamdanids, the rite of remembrance became 
widespread. This popularization allowed for the primitive expressions of grief to evolve 
into more ritualized ceremonies. During the Buyids dynasty, the once private gatherings 
became public marches and ritualized visitation of Hussein’s shrine at Karbala. Public 
rituals such as the ziyarah grave visitations developed a high degree of formalization, and 
the recitation of the ziyarah text achieved almost liturgical status. It is also quite likely 
that the evolution of formalized chest beating (latm) rituals to the rhythm of recited 
poetry can be traced to this period.  
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During the second stage that began at the time of the fall of Baghdad and 
continued through the Muslim dark ages until the modern period, the form of the rites of 
remembrance became more fixed and more organized. Similarly, the different human 
elements involved in the rites of remembrance, including wailing chanters, reciters and 
storytellers became more numerous. In this stage, striking oneself became a firm element 
in some of the rites of remembrance. During this second stage, the content of the rituals 
became more embellished with lack of historical accuracy. Accounts that could not be 
historically proven were introduced to the body of the narrative to excite and elevate the 
spirit of the mourners. More importantly, the content of the Ashura rituals became more 
concerned with death rather than with life. Participating in Ashura rituals became an 
event that would bring benefit to mourners in the grave rather than serve as an incentive 
to make them change their miserable situation. The poetry of lamentation and poetry 
about virtue that began late in the first stage became basic material in the rites of 
remembrance by the second stage. 
During this stage, the Safavid Shia scholars developed radical hagiographic 
characterizations of Hussein and Karbala in their literary sources to define and legitimize 
their rule and to differentiate between their state and their Sunni rivals and threats. They 
transformed some of the already formalized rituals into more extreme versions involving 
self-inflicted bloodshed, and they introduced new rituals altogether such as the ta‘ziyeh 
passion play.104 
During the third stage that began from the beginnings of the modern period until 
the present, security and freedom, which the Shia community has enjoyed in most places, 
have enabled the rites of remembrance to be performed publicly without fear of 
prohibition by the authorities or the populace. In addition, the occasions for performing 
the rites of remembrance have become more numerous and not restricted to the first ten 
days of Muharram or to the day of arba‘in. They have expanded to a commemoration and 
remembrance of the Prophets, other Holy family members, and important Shia. Private 
rites of remembrances on the occasions of celebrating a new house, the return from the 
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pilgrimage to Mecca, and other private occasions were also held. In term of content, the 
Ashura rituals narratives became used as a vehicle by political pundits to either support 
the ruling elites in the cases of Qajar dynasty and in the case of Islamic Republic of Iran 
or to criticize the ruling elites as in the case of the Pahlavi dynasty.  
The language of the rites of remembrance is conveyed using sermons and 
lectures, which has become a vehicle to inform the public about political issues. There 
has also been more concern shown about the historical accuracy by eliminating 
historically unreliable accounts. The tashabih play, which reached its zenith during the 
rule of the Qajar, has decline and become a historical folklore. Some of the bloodletting 
rituals were outlawed in Iran and discouraged in other places.  
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V. RITUAL THEORY AND SHIA COMMUNAL IDENTITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Rituals have been defined generally as “repetitious and stylized symbolic bodily 
actions that are centered on cosmic structures and/or sacred presence.”105 They can serve 
many purposes including fulfillment of religious obligations or ideals, which is often seen 
in the practice of many world religions. Rituals can also serve to satisfy spiritual or 
emotional needs, cement social bonds, display respect or submission, state one's 
membership, obtain social acceptance or approval  of a particular event, or sometimes 
simply to enjoy the ritual itself.106 
Religious rituals, like Ashura rituals, are unique and more distinctive than secular 
rituals. They not only serve some of the above purposes, but they also play a significant 
role in creating and maintaining religions. Such a role enables religious rituals to be an 
even stronger in strengthening social bonds than secular rituals are.  According to Emile 
Durkheim (1858-1917), “religious rituals are used by people to sacrilize the social 
structure and bonds of the community and to ensure the unconscious priority of 
communal identification.”107 Durkheim asserts that rituals transform knowledge into 
belief and membership into belonging. As periodic opportunities for the social group to 
assemble itself and project sacred images that actually represent the community occur, 
rituals are designed to arouse a passionate intensity and feelings of “effervescence,” in 
which individuals experience something larger than themselves.108  
In this chapter, Emile Durkheim’s social ritual theory will be used to show the 
importance of Ashura rituals as they relate to group cohesion and solidarity by explaining 
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how Ashura rituals are constructed, embraced, and have evolved. More importantly, this 
chapter will illustrate how Ashura rituals are used by Shia as a way to reunite and 
reconfirm common values shared between members of Shia societies. This analysis will 
rely on Randall Collins’s model, which is derived from Durkheim's seminal theory of 
ritual presented in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. This model contains a 
handful of elements considered prominent to Durkheim's theory in explaining how rituals 
transform knowledge into belief and membership into belonging. This model and its 
elements are depicted in Figure 1.109 
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Figure 1.   Schematic Diagram of Ritual Theory 
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B. RITUAL MODEL 
Before getting acquainted with the model, the chapter will first define what 
“belief” and “belonging” mean in this context. Here “beliefs” are not simply considered 
to be propositions that an individual psychologically holds to be true. In other words, 
beliefs are not merely knowledge of something, but rather a step beyond knowledge. 
They form the foundation of human constructed mental models and through beliefs, 
humans process, analyze, and make sense of new information. Beliefs are integral, 
unconditional, and secured against the doubts and challenges one faces in the society.110   
“Belonging,” too, is not just mere association in which an individual joins a 
group. Instead, belonging is a step beyond membership just as beliefs are a step beyond 
knowledge. Belonging involves internal factors such as attraction, identification, and 
cohesion that make the individual committed and desirous to join a group. 
Considering the aforementioned definition of beliefs and belonging, this chapter 
will now discuss Randall Collins’s ritual model. Figure 1 shows that belief and belonging 
are end products of many simultaneously interacting elements that often influence each 
other in both directions. The model begins with a fundamental event from which the rest 
of the elements are derived directly or indirectly. This fundamental event is an emotional 
state characterized by anxiety, uncertainty, and/or transition.  
According to the model, this emotional state is a trigger for co-presence and 
practice, which are fundamental in creating beliefs and belongings. Co-presence refers to 
the spatio-temporal conditions under which humans can interact with each other.111 
Durkheim confirmed that under “great collective shock... social interactions become 
much more frequent and active ... individuals seek one another out and come together 
more.”112  The tragic death of a loved one is an example of such an emotional state that 
often triggers members of the surviving group to exhibit three major reactions to the 
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tragedy. These major reactions influence how the lost of a love one is remembered. The 
first reaction by the surviving members is the passionate urge to safeguard the memory of 
what happened and to make sure that the future generations do not forget the tragedy. The 
second reaction to the tragedy is the strong desire to make sense of the agonizing loss and 
to create meaning out of the tragedy, making sure that the love one did not die in vain and 
that his or her sacrifice must have a positive impact on the group. Finally, the members of 
the surviving group often exhibit a tremendous sense of guilt for not taking steps in 
preventing the tragedy and as such suffer from a sense of collective “survivors’ guilt.”113   
The tragedy of Karbala is a great example of the tremendous angst and social 
insecurity that hit the Muslim world in general, and the Holy Family and their partisans in 
particular. The latter sought each other to safeguard the memory of Hussein, to make 
sense of the tragedy, and to address their collective guilt. This impulse to assemble is 
independent of any intention to engage in ritual practice, and even apart from the larger 
ritual process, but it has a profound influence over those assembled and in time lead to 
Ashura rituals. 
1. Co-presence 
As the model shows, co-presence is one of the two major building blocks for 
generating belief and a sense of belonging.  
Durkheim states that it is in times of stress, uncertainty, and doubt that “with 
passion” we seek “the company of those who feel and think as we do.”114 When people 
seek each other during tragic events, they are not motivated by obtaining accurate 
information about the event but instead are motivated by reducing their uncertainty and 
preserving, even escalating, their belief.115 The profound grief and extreme distress, 
which aroused at the aftermath of the Karbala tragedy, gave the people who knew about 
what happened an excuse for gathering together, a subject of conversation, and an 
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incentive to re-examine their attitudes and opinions and to review their position with 
regard to the whole system (Caliphate system). These gathering were spontaneous and 
were made up of small groups of Muslims, both followers of the Holy Family and others. 
They held meetings recounting the events in Karbala, criticizing the authorities that 
committed the unspeakable act, and more importantly, solidified their belief in the 
sacredness of Imam Hussein.116 
In terms of belonging, co-presence plays an important role. Douglas Marshall 
stated:117 
Simple contact between individuals is a powerful source of liking and 
cohesion, playing as it does upon multiple mechanisms of attachment, 
including mere exposure, closeness, similarity, and mere categorization. 
Moreover, both the developmental and ethological evidence indicate that 
such proximity-attachment linkages have strong biological underpinnings. 
The spontaneous gathering that occurred among Hussein sympathizers created a sense of 
cohesiveness, closeness, and likeness among the individuals of the group. These 
spontaneous meetings increased the bonds and sense of belonging among the members of 
the group. Later, these transformed into planned gatherings with the guidance of early 
Imams and brought about the core from which the rites of remembrance as an institution 
began and developed during the course of history. The increased social interactions 
among Hussein sympathizers caused the group to become different with clear boundaries 
separating it from the rest.   
2. Practices 
As the model shows, co-presence is one of the two major building blocks for 
generating belief and a sense of belonging to a group. The other building block is a 
practice or ritual.  
When people come together in times of stress, uncertainty, and doubt, they not 
only come together to reinforce their beliefs and solidify their relationships and belonging 
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but they also come together to get something done. In spite of any apparent differences, 
these people ultimately wind up participating in a combination of specific common 
practices that eventually become developed behaviors with the purpose to focus attention 
on the beliefs and belonging of the people in order to solidify their union.118 In other 
words, practice also plays a role in reinforcing beliefs and strengthening belonging to the 
group, as is the case with co-presence. 
Following the battle of Karbala, small groups of people began to gather 
spontaneously in Kufa, Medina, and stopping places en route from Karbala. These people 
began to develop feelings of responsibility for the loss, both because of their failure to die 
with Hussein on the battlefield and their belief that he had given his life on their behalf. 
During these spontaneous gatherings, members of the martyrs’ surviving families would 
cultivate these guilt feelings and implant with them seeds of the public rites of 
remembrance as an institution. Those who remained faithful to the Holy Family began a 
series of common mourning practices beginning with the simple expression of 
condolence and developing into stories retelling the battle and its circumstances. These 
stories would be expressed through extreme emotion and cries for vengeance against the 
Umayyad. Considering poetry has traditionally been part of Arabic culture since before 
Islam, it is also not surprising that poets also began to join in these gatherings. The poets 
would lead lamentation (niyahah) sessions supporting Imams who provided the liturgical 
basis for this new manifestation popular piety.119 This rudimentary ritual practice played 
a major role in reinforcing Shia belief and belonging and developed throughout the ages 
to become what it is today.  
3. Other Elements of the Model 
Other elements of the model in Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of Ritual Theory 
that emanate from co-presence and practice are very important in enhancing belief and  
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belonging. These elements are attention focus, subjectivity, and behavior. Under the 
influence of co-presence and practice, people become more task focused, see themselves 
as a unit and not as subject, and enact behaviors they may not otherwise do.  
In Ashura, for example, people would not while alone inflect pain on themselves 
or discomfort by self-flagellating their backs and foreheads. They would not beat their 
breast forcibly and for an extended period. They would not weep for long hours if alone, 
and lastly they would not march for long distances to make pilgrimage without a group 
influences. The presence of other individuals jointly practicing the different Ashura 
rituals whether self-flagellating in harmony, weeping in harmony, latm in harmony, or 
marching in harmony helps each member in the group focus attention on the ritual by 
minimizing any outside interference and by inducing an altered subjective state allowing 
for behavior that would not occurred if the practice was done in isolation and only by an 
individual. 
Co-presence and practice facilitate the Ashura rituals by improving one’s 
performance, eliminating subjectivity, and allowing for the performance of peculiar 
behaviors. In other words, these elements that are derived from co-presence and practice 
facilitate the practice of rituals and solidify further Shia belief and belonging. 
C. SUMMARY  
Collins model, which is derived from Durkheim's seminal theory of ritual, shows 
how rituals transform knowledge into belief and membership into belonging. It also 
shows how rituals are constructed, embraced, and evolved. The tragic event of Karbala 
and the Ashura rituals that ensued support this model and this theory. The tragedy of 
Karbala was a watershed event triggering the development of Ashura rituals. Through co-
presence and practice and with the interaction of other elements mentioned above, the 
Ashura rituals have developed from early rudimentary rituals into full-fledged rituals. 
Each Ashura ritual practice plays a vital role in reinforcing Shia identity and 
collective memory. The acts of weeping, latm, and self-flagellation, for example, solidify 
belief and belonging. They allow the believer to identify himself with Hussein’s cause,  
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voice his regret physically and mentally for not being able to be with him in Karbala and 
help him win the battle, protest emotionally against injustice and oppression as he 
experiences it around himself, and amass Gods’ rewards.120 
The memorial services ((majalis al-ta’ziya), the visitation of Hussein’s tomb in 
Karbala particularly on the occasion of the 10th day of the month of Muharram (Ashura) 
and the 40th day after the battle (ziyarat Ashura and ziyarat arba‘in), the public mourning 
processions (al-mawakib al-husayniyya), and the representation of the battle of Karbala 
in the form of a play (tashabih) bring all Shia together as they have done throughout 
centuries to reinforce their belief and strengthen their sense of belonging with each other 
as a group, making them a separate body within a larger body of world Muslims with 
their own rituals, own theology, and own identity.  
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VI. CURRENT KARBALA NARRATIVE AND POLITICAL 
IMPLICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The historical evolution of Ashura rituals discussed in chapter IV shows how the 
rites of remembrance have evolved from a predominantly passivism content reflected in 
the first two stages of Ashura ritual evolution to a predominantly activism content 
reflected in the third stage. The content of the first two stages was characterized by the 
development of relatively distinct Shia identities and doctrines and the reinforcement of 
the sense of communal identity built around collective mourning and suffering. It was 
also characterized by the emphasis of individual religious experiences of mourning and 
regret, embodied through tears and blood. The third stage, on the other hand, was 
characterized by social and political activism in the face of political and social injustice. 
This chapter will discuss how the contents of the third stage of the rites of 
remembrance developed and their political implications. The discussion will focus on 
important Shia leaders who were instrumental in shifting the meanings of Ashura from 
the soteriological to the revolutionary meanings. There will be mention of the leaders 
who have operationalized such meanings. A discussion of how the new meaning of the 
Karbala narrative has affected the practice of Ashura rituals in Iran and Lebanon in form 
and content will be analyzed. 
B. KARBALA NARRATIVE FUNDAMENTAL REFORMULATION 
Prior to the third stage of Shia rituals’ evolution, Karbala narratives tended to 
stress the soteriological dimension of the symbolism. This view did not, however, 
preclude the use of these narratives as a means for challenging the state, as was the case 
during many political crises and upheavals. A good example occurred during the toppling 
of the Umayyad from power by the Abbasid in 749-50 AD. The Abbasid leader, Abu 
Moslem, made use of popular sentiments against the Umayyads rulers by appealing to  
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popular sentiments for the family of the Prophet. The Abbasid claimed to be the progeny 
of Mohammad’s uncle, Abbas, and as such, they depicted themselves as being more 
legitimate to lead the Muslim Ummah than others not related to the Holy Family.121 
Such attempts of using the Karbala narratives to challenge the state were rare and 
were not based on fundamental shifts in the meaning of Ashura rituals but based on a 
political ploy to seize power.  
The Karbala narratives were not fundamentally reformulated until the 1960s and 
the 1970s. This fundamental reformulation did not take place in a vacuum. The Muslim 
world had been suffering under the bitter experience of imperialism from “external” 
powers such as Britain, France, and Italy. After independence, has been suffering under 
the oppressive regimes from “internal” powers in the form of military dictators or self-
imposed monarchies whose military and police’s only function was to safeguard the 
interest of tyrant rulers and the interest of the same “external” powers whose shadow 
never departed. Under this reality, there were many political protests that took place prior 
to the 1960s-1970s shifting the meaning of Ashura rituals. In Iran for example, there were 
campaigns against the Baha’i religion in the nineteenth century, the Tobacco Rebellion of 
1892, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, and the revolutionary activities of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Similar political protests occurred in Iraq against the British occupation, such 
as the 1920 Shia uprising against the British, which had the full support of Shia religious 
leaders. During this period, many Shia religious leaders were deported from Iraq 
Noteworthy is Sayyid Salih al-Hilli said to be the most effective preacher and rawzeh 
khwan in Iraq in his time.122 
Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi, a religious scholar who studied with Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the 1960s, was possibly the first person to attempt an alteration of the 
Karbala narrative.  Najafabadi wrote Shahid-e javid (The Eternal Martyr) in 1968, in 
which he demystified the Karbala Paradigm in an effort to reinterpret it in a more 
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politically activist arena.123 He was very controversial among his peers since he had 
challenged the long held notions that the Battle of Karbala was a divinely preordained 
event and that Hussein knew beforehand that his opposition would be futile. He argued 
that Hussein was determined to seize power from the Umayyads and to take over the 
government itself. In addition, made the controversial assertion that Hussein had no prior 
knowledge of his imminent martyrdom, an opinion that violated the basic tenets of 
Shiism that view Hussein as being fully aware of the past, present, and future, as well as 
the events of Karbala. Najafabadi took these statements further in criticizing the long 
accepted view that Hussein’s movement and sacrifice had the essential role of preserving 
true Islam for future generations, and even refuted the idea that the long-term effects of 
the massacre were in fact positive. Najafabadi said that the Umayyads were not damaged 
by the incident and Hussein accomplished nothing to expose corruption among the 
Umayyads because the corruption was already a well-known fact.124 
In spite of Najafabadi’s drastically converse opinions of the view of Karbala and 
the immense controversy he generated, his revision of the Karbala narrative marks the 
inception of a debate that began in the 1960s and continued through the 1990s. Numerous 
other ideologues, such as Ali Sharaiti, expanded upon Najafabadi’s ideas, but none were 
as effectual as Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, who was able to find a compromising 
position that allowed Muslims to follow the innovative model of Karbala without 
infringing upon the fundamental tenets of Shiism. 
Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, a very close companion of Ayatollah Khomein, 
was hailed as “the Ideologue of the Revolution.”  He presented a radically different view 
from Najafabadi. While Motahhari disagreed with more customarily accepted 
interpretations of the Karbala narrative, he did not outright refuse accounts as Najafabadi 
did. Instead, he wanted to make the traditional rituals of Muharram lamentation pertinent 
to modern social issues by describing the inner character that should motivate 
congregants who grieve Hussein. He stated: 125 
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A martyr creates the spirit of valor, and weeping for him means 
participation in his valor and in conformity with his longing for 
martyrdom…Another moral which the society should draw, is that 
whenever a situation demanding sacrifice, the people should have the 
feelings of a martyr and willingly follow his heroic example. Weeping for 
the martyr means association with his fervor, harmony with his spirit and 
conformity with his longing. 
He believed that the movement and martyrdom of Hussein and his followers served four 
distinct functions: delegitimizing Yazid’s rule, which can be extended to any Muslim 
leader deemed immoral and corrupt; responding to the calls of Kufans, which can be 
extended to responding to the calls of any oppressed Muslims; acting against the religious 
corruption of the Umayyads by promoting good and discouraging evil, which is an 
obligation incumbent upon all Muslims and can be extended through time; and lastly 
propagating and teaching the true meaning of Islam to the Muslims which also can be 
extended through time.126 Unlike Najafabadi, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari did not 
infringe upon fundamental Shia Tenets sealed within the Karbala narrative such as the 
moral character and infallibility of the Imam, loyalty to the Imam, courage, honor, and a 
willingness to be martyred. However, he did instill the narrative with instant political 
bearing by positioning it within the outline of active political struggle to maintain justice 
and pure Islamic ideals. This new Karbala narrative has gained common approval among 
Iranian Shia as well as other Shia in Lebanon, Iraq, and other countries. It has also 
become part of the Ashura rituals content. 
This fundamental reformulation of the Karbala narrative that has taken place 
during the third stage reflected the anger and aspirations of the people suffering under 
imperialism and its cronies who have been ruling the Muslim world. The final synthesis 
has created a narrative that serves both the old soteriological functions as well as the 
newly reformulated active and literal emulation of Hussein’s movement. These two 
concepts are simultaneously present in any given context and are not mutually exclusive 
but represent two sides of the same Shia coin.127 
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C. KARBALA NARRATIVE OPERATIONALIZATION  
The third stage of Ashura rituals evolution has created a new narrative with 
dualistic functions, the traditional soteriological function which provides an opportunity 
for spiritual redemption of Shia to gain salvation and admission to paradise and the new 
revolutionary function which uses Ashura rituals as a vehicle for expressing the current 
socioeconomic grievances of the population and mobilizing people for political action. 
Many infamous Shia leaders were able to operationalize this new Karbala narrative by 
weaving protest themes into the narratives of the ritual sermons, equating unjust 
leadership with Yazid and the revolutionaries with followers of Hussein. The 
operationalization of the Karbala narrative through Ashura rituals has had tremendous 
political implications that have been felt throughout the globe especially since the Islamic 
Revolution of Iran. 
The most influential and effective Shia leader who made use of Ashura as a 
vehicle of social and political action and reconciled it with the spiritual and ritual view of 
the sufferings of Hussein is no other than Imam Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini was active in using Ashura rituals as a vehicle to 
promote opposition to the shah. In one of Khomeini’s speech given on the occasion of 
Muharram, in November 23, 1987 titled “The Triumph of Blood Over the Sword,” he 
stated:128  
With the approach of Muharram, we are about to begin the month of epic 
heroism and self-sacrifice-the month in which blood triumphed over the 
sword, the month in which truth condemned falsehood for all eternity and 
branded the mark of disgrace upon the forehead of all oppressors and 
satanic governments; the month that has taught successive generations 
throughout history the path of victory over the bayonet; the month that 
proves the superpowers may be defeated by the word of truth; the month 
in which the leader of the Muslims taught us how to struggle against all 
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freedom, desire independence, and proclaim the truth may triumph over 
tanks, machine guns, and the armies of Satan, how the word of truth may 
obliterated falsehood. 
In another speech given on the occasion of Arba’in commemoration, in January 15, 1979, 
he stated:129  
This year, the commemoration of the fortieth day after the anniversary of 
the Imam’s martyrdom has come in the midst of a whole series of fortieth 
day commemorations of the martyrdom of the followers of that great 
Islamic figure. It is as if the blood of our martyrs were the continuation of 
the blood of the martyrs of Karbala, and as if the commemoration of our 
brothers were the echo of the commemoration of those brave ones who fell 
at Karbala. Just as their pure blood brought to an end the tyrannical rule of 
Yazid, the blood of our martyrs has shattered the tyrannical monarchy of 
the Pahlavis. 
Khomeini recreated and revived the spirit of Ashura through his messages against the 
despotic Pahlavi rule and the exploitive domination of alien powers over Muslims 
throughout the world. His interpretation of the true spirit of Karbala is in accordance with 
Mutahhari’s well-accepted narratives. He believed that the battle of Karbala was not 
limited to any particular period of time but a continuing struggle in the “Eternal Now.”130  
Khomeini broke with the Shia tradition practiced during the first and second stage 
of Ashura rituals evolution that shied away from being associated with governments or 
most forms of politics. He openly participated in oppositional politics and eventually 
establishing a theocratic state.  He challenged and dismissed the ulama and rawzeh 
khwans who had transformed the true spirit of Ashura into a simple lamentation ritual and 
using it as an ordinary means of their livelihoods. He revitalized the true essence of 
Ashura and used it as a weapon to promulgate his message based on the Islamic 
principles. Without such platform, Khomeini might not have succeeded in reaching the 
masses and in restoring true Islamic values thereby reviving the Muslim community.  
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In 1963, Khomeini encouraged a wide variety of oppositional activities to be 
carried out during the ritual season. More specifically, he worked very hard to coordinate 
a multicity opposition movement centered on Muharram rituals. He gave antigovernment 
speeches himself while encouraging others to do the same. He also exerted his influence 
to encourage ritual organizers to compose and use protest slogans and chants in their 
rituals.  
In Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was instrumental in operationalizing the 
new Karbala narrative. In Iraq, it was Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who brought otherwise 
feuding Shia factions together to form the united Iraqi Alliance, a strong Shia political 
alliance. Contrasting with Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic regime in Iran whose 
preferred means for political and social activism was through direct partaking in politics 
under the doctrine of “Governance of the Jurist,” Ayatollah Sistani prefers the use of 
fatwa (edict concerning religious law) to persuade social and political changes rather than 
to hold office. While the approaches may differ, the strategies are the same in aiming to 
actively apply pressure in an effort to attain social and political changes. In the summer 
of 2003, Sistani issued a fatwa against the Coalitional Provisional Authority plan for the 
Iraqi constitution to be created by a constitutional drafting body, chosen by a selection 
process and not by direct elections. He stated in his fatwa:131 
Those forces have no jurisdiction whatsoever to appoint members of the 
Constitution preparation assembly. Also there is no guarantee either that 
this assembly will prepare a constitution that serves the best interests of 
the Iraqi people or express their national identity whose backbone is sound 
Islamic religion and noble social values. The said plan is unacceptable 
from the outset. First of all there must be a general election so that every 
Iraqi citizen - who is eligible to vote - can choose someone to represent 
him in a foundational Constitution preparation assembly. Then the drafted 
Constitution can be put to a referendum. All believers must insist on the 
accomplishment of this crucial matter and contribute to achieving it in the 
best way possible. 
Ayatollah Sistani also uses the Ashura rituals and symbols to influence the 
masses. The 2004 election occurred among a milieu of Shia symbolism and religious 
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feeling. Ayatollah Sistani and his lieutenants were actively involved in getting out the 
votes, especially Shia women.  “Truly, women who go forth to the polling centers on 
election day are like Zaynab, who went forth to Karbala.” These were the words 
attributed to Sistani and were adorned with Sistani’s photograph to every election poster. 
By comparing Iraqi women to Zaynab, Sistani was encouraging them to challenge the 
terrorists and take up the struggle on behalf of justice, comparing them to Zaynab heroic 
struggle on the face of Yazid’s army and court.132 Under Sistani’s auspices, the 
politically and culturally oppressed Iraq Shia organized themselves to become the 
dominant power bloc behind the writing of the new Iraqi constitution and election of a 
Shia dominated parliament.133 After 1,400 years of Sunni hegemony in the region and 
literal subjugation of the Shia under Sunni rule, Hussein’s spiritual heirs had established 
the first Shia led Arab nation in history by popular election.   
In Lebanon, the Lebanese group Hezbollah,134 under the leadership of Sayyid 
Hassan Nasrallah, has also used the Ashura ceremonies as an effective means to 
propagate its message. During Ashura, the Shia group is not just remembering Hussein 
but also remembering its own guerrillas who died fighting in wars against Israel. 
Hezbollah use Ashura to rail against their domestic foes as well as against their regular 
targets: Israel and the United States. In chants at Ashura processions, mourners equate 
Hezbollah's modern-day enemies Israel and the United States with the dreadful Yazid.  
A leading Hezbollah cleric Sayyed Hashem Safieddin said at the end of a politically 
charged Ashura sermon this year:135 
Let us return to the blood of Hussein, the blood of Karbala ... So we can be 
victorious, through our injustices and our rights. As we were victorious 
over the Zionist enemy….we will achieve subsequent victories for  
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Lebanon and our Arab and Islamic nation,” he told thousands dressed in 
black to mourn Hussein, whose death is also know as “The Victory of 
Blood over the Sword. 
During the 2003 sermon commemorating the memorial of Imam Hussein’ arba’in, 
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlullah stated:136 
The slogans of Karbala are the slogans of life in its entirety. . . . Living 
Ashura is standing against oppression. Such a stand should fill our hearts 
and minds each time we face the oppressors and arrogant powers, whether 
in Muslim countries or in the whole world. It is not living in a tragedy of 
tears and hitting ourselves with swords or chains . . . for swords should be 
raised against the enemy as we were taught by the Imam (a.s). 
D. SHIA COMMUNITIES COMPARISON 
The effect of the new Karbala narrative on the current practice of Ashura rituals is 
very evident in the Shia communities of Iran and Lebanon. The following comparison of 
Ashura rituals in these two countries will be analyzed from a wider lens, discussing the 
differences and commonalities between these countries from the context of form and 
content and not from the context of variations in clothing, ritual devices, banners, 
rhythmic stanza, and so on. The latter is so immense and depends on ethnic differences, 
social class differences, and even differences among organizers within the same 
community. 
1. Lebanon 
Lebanon is a small country, roughly 0.7 times the size of Connecticut137 with a 
Shia population of roughly 1.4 million, about 40%, of the total population.138 Lebanese 
Shia population is mostly concentrated in southern Lebanon. The area known as Jabal 
Amil is considered the Shia heartland and it extends from the wadis and hills of southern 
Lebanon to the southern Biqa valley. Jabal Amil was one of the major Shia center for 
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scholarship at least by the late 14th century. During the fifteen-century, many scholars 
from Jabal Amil, Iraq and Bahrain all assisted in the installation of Shia Islam in Safavid 
Persia (1502–1736).139 This was well before the Persian cities of Mashhad, Shiraz, or 
Qom emerged as major centers of Shia scholarship. 
Ashura rituals in Lebanon have been revolutionized in recent decades. Once a 
ritual focused on mourning, it now stresses Islamic activism. The activism role 
historically played by Hussein and his sister Zaynab has become the center theme of 
contemporary Ashura rituals. While Hussein and his sacrifice in blood continue to be the 
central piece of the rituals, his sister Zaynab and her sacrifice in sweat become as 
important especially for women mourners. This transformation was due to many 
important social, political, and religious factors. The Shia of Lebanon were marginalized 
in their own society, suffered tremendously in a series of conflicts, most notably the 
Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon that ended in 2000 and the recent 2006 Israeli war 
on Hezbollah, the most powerful, most popular, and most respected Shia party in 
Lebanon. Religiously, there was a wide spread opposition among pious Shia Muslims to 
traditional forms of commemoration which contributed to the emergence of a new Ashura 
attitude that is more politically active and expressive, in contrast to a politically quiet 
Shia of the past. This activism theme is clearly evident by the changes that took place in 
Ashura rituals practices.  
In the current Lebanese majalis, the sermons are typically long with a content that 
is characteristic of the third stage of Ashura ritual evolution. The sermons are more 
concerned with historical accuracy and less tolerant of unfounded exaggerations whose 
purpose is to heighten emotions and make people weep. The sermons’ main goal is to 
convey religious, social, and political lessons of instruction about the newly determined 
authentic meanings of Karbala yet still link the history to the present. The lectures given 
in majalis became a sort of analytical tool used to make sense of the Karbala tragedy, to 
analyze major issues facing the Muslim world, and to emphasize the importance of 
activism.  
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By far one of the importance shifts in the Ashura rituals is the emphasis on the 
women’s role in society. This shift in the Shia Lebanese women’s role is due to the 
reinterpretation of the historical behavior of Hussein’ sister, Zaynab, during and 
following the events of Karbala. Zaynab was portrayed in the first and second stages of 
Ashura evolution as a woman lost in grief and wildly demonstrative of her misery over 
the dead and dying. The current depiction, however, emphasizes her courage, resilience, 
and strengths and credits her for safeguarding the history of Ashura for future 
generation.140 This new depiction of Zaynab is understood to be a model for public 
activism and has given contemporary pious Shia women responsibility for public welfare 
equal that of men. A great example of Shia Lebanese women’s participation is their role 
in the rebuilding process that has been taking place after the 2006 Israel war on Lebanon. 
The Shia women have had major roles in public community service activities providing 
health, food, and shelter for the needy. 
The current Lebanese masirat have seen drastic changes since the reformulation 
of Karbala narratives. Perhaps the most noticeable change in the masirat has occurred in 
the style of latm. Traditionally, the masirat in the southern Lebanese town of Nabatieh, 
involved a scene of blood bath with mourners soaked on their own blood marching and 
self-flagellating on the rhythm of niyahah. As the new Karbala narratives took shape in 
Lebanon and grew in popularity, latm that involved the shedding of one’s blood was 
criticized as un-Islamic because it involves purposely injuring oneself. Shia Religious 
Authority Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, who lives in southern Lebanon, previously 
issued a fatwa, discouraging Shia from practicing any rituals that can cause self-injury on 
the basis that such rituals violate religious law and portray Shia in a bad light in the eyes 
of non-Shia. Similarly, the Iranian leader, Hojjat al-Islam Ali Khamenei, issued a 1994 
fatwa “condemning bloodshed during Muharram. He ruled that the Ashura rituals, as 
practiced in Nabatiyya and many other parts of the Shiite world, were not Islamic 
practices but secular traditions. Khamenei is accepted as the supreme Shiite leader by 
Hezbollah, which has embraced and promoted his perspective.”141 
                                                 
140 Lara Deeb, “Lebanese Shia Women Temporality and Piety,” ISIM Review, 18 (Autumn 2006). 
141 Norton, “Ritual, Blood, and Shiite Identity: Ashura in Nabatiyya, Lebanon.” 
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Those mourners who still want to shed their blood were encouraged to donate 
blood to local blood banks; however, some are still not heeding the advice of the religious 
Shia clergy and prefer to self-flagellate in order to share their pain with the pain of their 
beloved Imam.  
Another noticeable change in the Lebanese masirat is in the role of women. They 
are no longer mere spectators but constitute part of the processions. They are organized 
by age groups similar to the men and dressed in a traditional Muslim long dress with head 
covering. Unlike the men, the women do not perform latm but each group is led in 
chants, or nadbat (elegies), by a leader. Many of them carry pictures of their martyrs 
assumed to be their loved one killed during conflicts with their internal and external 
enemies. Other women in chains assume the role of the surviving women of the Battle of 
Karbala who were taken captive by Caliph Yazid’s army and reenact the long and 
sorrowful march to Yazid’s court.142 This active participation by women is a testament to 
the true symbol and role that Zaynab had played during and after the tragedy of Karbala. 
Perhaps one of the most distinctive processions throughout the Shia communities 
in the world is the one sponsored by Hezbollah, which takes place each year in several 
areas of Lebanon, including the southern suburbs of Beirut, Nabatieh, and Baalbek in the 
Beqaa. The uniqueness of these processions is its military style. The procession begins 
with large images and banners carried in a military manner by strong and well ordered 
young men. They are followed by large organized groups of men and boys dressed 
uniformly as scouts or entirely in black performing latm that does not involve blood. 
Floats depicting scenes related to Karbala or the Islamic Resistance follow behind. Some 
of these scenes might have the pictures of famous Hezbollah martyrs such as Imad 
Mughniyah, a Hezbollah military commander who was allegedly killed by Israel in a car 
bomb on February 13, 2008. Behind the floats are groups of high-ranking religious 
leaders and elected officials. Behind them, a well ordered groups of men and boys  
 
 
                                                 
142 Deeb, “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice.”  
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marching, demonstrating solidarity with both the party and Hussein. Next come 
organized groups of girls and women follow by a general crowd of women with their 
children, all dressed in black expressing their solidarity.143 
2. Iran 
Iran is the second largest country in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia. It is 
overwhelmingly Shia Muslim (about 89%), making it the world’s most populous Shia 
nation. About 9% of the population is Sunni Muslim and the remaining 2% form small 
communities of Christians, Jews, Bahaians and Zoroastrians.144  
As discussed in Chapter IV, Iran religious scholars were instrumental in 
reformulating and operationalizing the Karbala narratives. They were able to transform 
Ashura commemorations from a ritual focused on mourning to one highlighting Islamic 
activism, and this is very obvious if one looks at Iranian Ashura ritual practices. 
In the current Lebanese majalis, the sermons begin by stressing the revolutionary 
message of Hussein’s movement. They emphasize the abstract ideals of the Karbala 
Paradigm, followed by words intended to encourage the believers to act in accordance 
with those ideals. These sermons usually have two messages. One message deals with 
immediate goals such as encouraging people to vote, discouraging drug use, or 
mobilizing people for the defense of the country. The other message deals with long-term 
goals such as improving relations with non-Shia Muslims. Furthermore, many sermons 
do not only focus on honoring Hussein and his followers but also honoring the father of 
the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, his sacrifices, and his achievements. These 
sermons are meant to keep alive the ideals of the revolution and put it on a similar 
religious pedestal as Hussein’s revolution.       
Similar to Lebanon, Iran also used Zaynab to challenge women’s earlier role in 
the society. The Iranian style model not only challenges the passivism role of some 
women who only care for their household but also challenges the Western oriented model 
                                                 
143 Deeb, “Living Ashura in Lebanon: Mourning Transformed to Sacrifice.”  
144 CIA World Fact Book website, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/goes/ir.html (accessed January 27, 2009). 
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of womanhood promoted by the Pahlavi regime, in which, women were allowed to 
remove their veil, dress as Westerners, work and compete side by side with men. Both 
these models were replaced by a new model based on the pious and revolutionary 
personalities of Zaynab.145    
The Iranian masirat are also unique in their goals. Some masirat can be described 
as political rallies and are carried out in order to preserve the ideals of the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution. These masirat are usually very large and organized by a coalition of groups 
and organizations affiliated or sympathizing with the current Iranian regime. Many high-
level government representatives attend these events such as Khamenei and other 
revolutionary adherents. However, the most common masirat with the various religious 
rituals imbedded in them and the banners associated with them tend to focus less on 
revolutionary ideals, imperialism, or the West but more on the soteriological aspect of the 
Battle of Karbala allowing the mourners to keep alive the memory of Hussein and to 
achieve salvation through devotion to the Imams. These masirat are not organized by the 
state or by political parties but by local associations such as neighborhood associations, 
corporatist associations, ethnic groups, professional associations, social networks, or 
families.146 These masirat are similar to the one performed in Lebanon. Niyahah, 
chanting, and latm that do not cause self-injury are performed. Despite the banning on 
self-flagellation, many groups still perform such rituals out of the eyes of the state. 
One interesting ritual practice not seen in Lebanon and other Shia communities 
emerged following the death of Khomeini in 1989. It consists of full mourning rituals, 
including sermons, lectures, procession, chants, latm, and more. These rituals are held  
each year during the nights of Muharram in honor of Khomeini to preserve his 
revolutionary message and they take place at the Khomeini’s shrine complex in 
southwest of Tehran.147  
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E. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The new dualistic functions of the Karbala narrative embraced by contemporary 
Shia, serve the traditional soteriological function, the revolutionary function, plus the 
strong Shia identity. These are embedded in the core of the Karbala narrative and shaped 
by Ashura rituals. These quintessential factors must be understood before formulating 
any U.S. foreign policies in Middle East.  
The importance of improving relations between Shia and the United State is 
crucial to the U.S. national interest. As stated in Chapter I, Shia make up only about 10-
20%148 of the world Muslim population but their population size is higher in the Middle 
East region where they are mostly concentrated as shown in Map 1: Demographic 
Distribution Estimates.149 They are a major component of the Middle East’s strategic 
equation, playing major roles in the Iranian nuclear crisis, in the political and security 
stability of Iraq and Lebanon, and to some extent in many Sunni dominated areas such as 
the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, and other countries in the Middle East region.   
Furthermore, since the liberation of Iraq that allowed Iraqi Shia to reach the 
“forbidden power,” Shia throughout the Middle East region have been mobilizing 
politically and demanding an equal representation in their own government. In Saudi 
Arabia, Shia represent 10 to 11% of the population and are mostly concentrated in an area 
where Saudi major repository oil reserves are located. Shia dominated regions had seen 
voter turnout twice as high as elsewhere in the Saudi 2005 municipal  
elections.150 The belief by the Shia in the Iraqi mantra of “one man, one vote” is 
influencing events in Lebanon and Bahrain where the Shia represent close to 40% and 
70%, respectively of the population. 
Iraq liberation has not only politically encouraged Shia in the Middle East but 
also generated and cemented new cultural, economic, and political ties among Shia 
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communities across the Middle East.  Since the fall of the Iraqi regime, the new regime 
re-opened the gates of Shia pilgrimage to Najaf and other holy Shiite cities in Iraq. 
Hundreds of thousands of Shia pilgrims from all over the world are making the 
pilgrimage every year, creating transnational networks of seminaries, mosques, and 
clerics that tie Iraq to every other Shia community, including, most important, that of 
Iran.  This increase in Shia political, economical, and social activisms is a testimony of 
their importance to the U.S. national interest. 
With the major shifts in Shia political environment that was initiated by the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran and revived by the liberation of Iraqi Shia, U.S. policy makers 
must understand that traditional Shiism that has been a faith of submission and 
lamentation no longer exists. U.S. policy makers must understand that Shia who have 
been marginalized from power can no longer accept the status quo and are clamoring for 
greater rights and more political influence.  
U.S. policy makers must understand that Shia are now supporting an ideology and 
a movement based on new Karbala narratives that equate unjust leadership with Yazid 
and the revolutionaries with followers of Hussein. Any action a Shia takes in his or her 
daily life and any action an internal or external government takes vis a vis Shia is 
reminiscent of the struggle of Yazid versus Hussein. With the emerging Shia revival, 
U.S. can no longer afford to be depicted as Yazid by supporting a policy that has been 
hostile to Shia.   
F. SUMMARY  
For centuries, Shia maintained an apolitical way of life, politically detached from 
the center of powers. However, since the reformulation of the Karbala narrative, it 
appears that Shia stoic compliance with the status quo is no longer acceptable not only 
socially and politically but also religiously as illustrated in the new Karbala narrative. 
With new fundamental reformulation of Karbala narratives, the Shia have risen 
collectively to force a change to achieve distinctive religious and political goals 
envisioned in Shia Islam. This is very evident in Ashura rituals practices seen in many 
Shia communities, especially in Lebanon and Iran. This is not to say that the importance 
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of Ashura has changed; rather, the transformation involves the emphasis on both the 
revolutionary and the soteriological meanings of Ashura rituals. The soteriological theme 
characterizing early stages of Ashura evolution now shares priority with the revolutionary 
orientation characterizing the third and current stage of Ashura commemorations. The 
deep political implications that have been revived in the third stage of Ashura evolution 
have become an essential part of Shia political life. Any U.S. policy that disregards the 
current Shia fundamental thinking will pit the U.S. against the Shia of the world, as has 
been the case for decades. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Battle of Karbala represents a watershed event in the schism between Sunni 
and Shia. For Shia, it epitomizes the bravery and piety of Hussein and his followers, the 
betrayal of his sworn supporters in Kufa, the immoral brutality of Hussein’s enemies and 
their disdain for the family of the Prophet and his followers. Most importantly, it 
epitomizes the divinely preordained sacrifice that Hussein and his followers had given on 
behalf of Muslims and Islam.  
The ensuing Ashura rituals that arose immediately after this tragedy were 
intended to safeguard this mythology. Each Ashura ritual whether memorial services, 
visitations of Hussein’s tomb, public mourning processions, Passion Plays, self-
flagellations, chest beating, or weeping plays a vital role in safeguarding this mythology. 
In doing so, it is reinforcing Shia identity and collective memory. As Emile Durkheim’s 
theory and Randal’s model demonstrated, through co-presence and practice, these rituals 
were able to bring all Shia together throughout centuries to reinforce their beliefs and 
strengthen their sense of belonging to each other as a group, making them a separate body 
within a larger body of world Muslims with their own rituals, own theology, and own 
identity. They allow the believer to transcend time and space by identifying himself with 
Hussein’s cause, express his regret physically and mentally for not being with Hussein in 
the battle of Karbala, object emotionally against the injustice and oppression besieging 
him, and amass God’s rewards.  As such, Ashura rituals do not represent the embodiment 
of a culture of death in which the partisans of Ali are worshipping Hussein’s death. 
Instead, they represent a sense of struggle of truth against falsehood, justice against 
injustice, and oppressed against oppressors. 
Since their inception, these Ashura rituals were not fixed in time. They have 
evolved in form and content from early rudimentary rituals into full-fledged rituals. This 
evolution has passed through three major stages, represented by the historical and cultural 
epochs through which the Muslims in general and the Shia in particular have lived until 
they reached the present form and content of today. A closer look at the evolution of 
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Ashura rituals in form and content has shown that these rituals are not merely rituals of 
lamentation and a source of salvation and redemption, but they represent an inspiring 
force and dynamic principles that can be used as a popular platform to effect changes in 
the socio-political sphere.  
During the first stage, the form of Ashura rituals acquired a fixed calendar and 
started as conversations, then changed to a story telling or a poem reciting, and finally 
they became a written account of the death of Hussein. At the end of this stage, poetry 
and prose were integrated. During the second stage, the form of the rites of remembrance 
became more fixed and more organized. Similarly, the different human elements 
involved in the rites of remembrance, including wailing chanters, reciters and storytellers 
became more numerous. In this stage, striking oneself became a firm element in some of 
the rites of remembrance. During the third stage, the occasions for performing the rites of 
remembrance have become more numerous and not restricted to the first ten days of 
Muharram or to the day of arba‘in but have expanded to commemoration remembrance 
of the Prophets, other Holy family members, and important Shia. Private rites of 
remembrances on the occasions of celebrating a new house, the return from the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, and other private occasions were also held. The passion play, which 
reached its zenith during the rule of the Qajar, has decline and become historical folklore. 
Some of the bloodletting rituals were outlawed in Iran and discouraged in other places.   
During the first stage, the content of the rituals focused on the details and 
historical background of the tragedy. Later the virtues and commendable position of the 
Imams of the Holy Family and their suffering were incorporated. During the second 
stage, the content of the rituals became more embellished and lacked historical accuracy. 
Accounts that could not be historically proven were introduced to the body of the 
narrative to excite and elevate the spirit of the mourners. More importantly, the content of 
the Ashura rituals became more concerned with death rather than with life. Participating 
in Ashura rituals became an incentive that would benefit mourners in the grave rather act 
as an incentive to make them change their poor current situations. The poetry of 
lamentation and poetry about virtue that began late in the first stage became basic 
material in the rites of remembrance by the second stage. During the third stage, there has 
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been a fundamental reformulation of Ashura rituals narrative that has created a new 
narrative with dualistic functions and serves both the soteriological functions as well as 
the active and literal emulation of Hussein’s movement. The language of the rites of 
remembrance is conveyed using sermons and lectures form, which has become a vehicle 
to inform the public about political and social issues. There has also been more concern 
with historical accuracy eliminating historically unreliable accounts.  
Many infamous Shia leaders were able to operationalize this new Karbala 
narrative by weaving protest themes into the narratives of the ritual sermons, equating 
unjust leadership with Yazid and the revolutionaries with followers of Hussein. These 
Shia leaders might differ in the tactics of how to use this new Ashura rituals narrative by 
either directly participating in politics under the doctrine of the “Governance of the 
Jurist” or indirectly influencing social and political changes through the use of fatwa 
instead of seeking to hold political office. The tactics might be different but the strategy 
is the same-seeking to actively exert pressure to achieve political and social changes.   
U.S. policy toward Shia must realize and recognize the emerging Shia power from 
its religious sphere rooted in the new meaning of Karbala narrative. U.S. policy makers 
must understand that Shia are supporting an ideology and a movement that wish to 
achieve for them a more equal status within their own societies. Any U.S. policy must 
attempt to satisfy Shia demands for political representation equal to their size while 
pacify Sunni anger and alleviating Sunni anxiety. Anything less will depict the U.S. as 
Yazid as has been the case since the U.S. support of the Shah of Iran, U.S. support of 
Israeli wars against the Shia of Lebanon, and continues U.S. support of Sunni Arab 
leaders in oppressing Shia minorities. Building bridges with the region's Shia could 
become the one clear achievement of the U.S. in its current tortured involvement in the 
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